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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to analyze and compare: 1) the ability of competing
aggregate accrual and frequency distribution models to detect extreme earnings
management, i.e. accounting-fraud, and 2) the ability of a composite model to predict
accounting-fraud using only prior period information. Studies have used various
models to detect earnings management in circumstances in which, a priori, some
management is likely to exist. Events with incentives to manage earnings analyzed
include issuing securities, maintaining positive earnings or an upward earnings trend,
increasing an earnings-based bonus, increasing subsidies during import relief
investigations, or decreasing penalties during antitrust investigations. However, few
studies have tested such models when there existed a virtual certainty about which
firms managed earnings. Using the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) to denote accounting-fraud
firms, I establish a format of analysis in which relative certainty exists.
Using that format, I test various aggregate accrual, frequency distribution, and
composite earnings management models' ability to distinguish between accounting
fraud and non-accounting-fraud matched firms. Aggregate accrual model results show
that total accruals, the simplest model, performs best in detecting accounting-fraud.
Also, those models calculated from the statement of cash flows always outperforms
those calculated from the balance sheet. Frequency distribution models show a
surprising lack of ability to detect accounting-fraud. The power of the test is
adversely affected by an apparent targeting bias for the SEC to investigate firms that
miss earnings thresholds.
As expected, the data intensive composite model shows the greatest ability to
identify accounting-fraud firms from ex ante data. The composite model only uses
prior period variables to represent financial condition of the firm, income-increasing
accounting choices, and potentially opportunistic behavior to distinguish an
accounting-fraud firm-year from a matched non-fraud firm-year. Significant variables
include total accruals, sales growth, cash sales growth, a proxy for age of firm,
inventory valuation method, straight-line depreciation, and merger/acquisition
activity.
Overall, aggregate accrual models calculated from the balance sheet and
frequency distribution models appear to have minimal ability to detect extreme
earnings management. Aggregate accrual models calculated from the statement of
cash flows appear to be more useful to distinguish accounting-fraud firms, although
they exhibit relatively low explanatory power. Composite model results represent a
particularly useful contribution since only prior period information is used to predict
future accounting-fraud firms. Additionally, the significance of certain variables
representing managerial behavior and incentives provide strong insight for
accountants and regulators concerning the prediction/detection of accounting-fraud.
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I. Introduction

Earnings management models are techniques to estimate managerial discretion in
reported earnings. Studies have used various models to detect/predict earnings
management in various circumstances in which incentives for such management was
hypothesized to exist, e.g., import relief investigations (Jones 199 1), management
buyouts (Perry and Williams 1994), initial public offerings ( Aharony, Lin, and Loeb
( 199 3) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong ( 1998a), and secondary equity offerings (Rangan
1998 and Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998b). However, few have tested the efficacy of such
models when enforcement actions filed by the S E C, or some other definitive descriptor,
was used to establish certainty about which firms managed earnings ( Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeny 1995, 1996, Beneish 1997, 1999, and Lee, Ingram, and Howard 1999).
This study's purpose is to extend prior research by analyzing earnings
management methodologies' and models' ability to detect/predict an extreme form of
earnings management, accounting- fraud. It is motivated by a lack of direct evidence that
earnings management models can detect (recognize ex post) or predict (recognize ex
ante) firm-years in which the S E C alleges that accounting-fraud occurred. This is an

important issue, because improving the ability of market participants to recognize
attempts by management to "mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company," 1 reduces the incentive for firms to operate in such a
manner, helping ensure the efficient allocation of capital.
I test the ability of various methodologies and models to identify firms that had

1

Healy and Wahlen (1999)

1

enforcement actions filed against them by the SEC for accounting-fraud. Details of these
SEC filed enforcement actions against firms have been published by the SEC since April
1982 in a series called Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). The
database for this research uses AAERs to identify those firms that had enforcement
actions filed against them for fraudulent financial reporting (i.e., accounting-fraud). There
are two primary benefits of this AAER definitive descriptor format for analysis: first, it
allows an opportunity to test the models under extreme circumstances; and second, the
SEC, via the filing of AAERs, denotes with relative certainty which firms committed
accounting-fraud. This establishes a "gold standard" testable situation in which the events
are definitively partitioned from the universe of non-accounting-fraud firms and are of an
unquestionably significant magnitude to promote detection.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Section II provides the
motivation; Section III discusses pertinent definitions of earnings management,
motivations for earnings management, the role of accruals, including the methodologies
and models to be tested; Section VI reviews earnings management and accounting-fraud
literature; Section V discusses the accounting-fraud and control firm samples; Section VI
contains the formal statements of hypotheses; Section VII contains the test methodologies
and empirical results; Section VIII concludes.
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II. Motivation

Earnings management and accounting-fraud have received significant media
attention during the past five years. In a speech on September 28, 1998, the former
Chairperson of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, stated that earnings management "can best be
characterized as a game among market participants." Levitt ( 1998) continues,
"Increasingly, I have become concerned that the motivation to meet Wall Street earnings
expectations may be overriding common sense business practices. Too many corporate
managers, auditors, and analysts are participants in a game of nods and winks. In the zeal
to satisfy consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth earnings path, wishful
thinking may be winning the day over faithful representation."
On November 9, 2000, the enforcement division of the SEC stated that corporate
earnings management remains its "number one priority." This desire to control improper
earnings management in the financial markets is also evident in the November 14, 2000
issue of the "Current Issues and Rulemaking Projects" report by the Division of
Corporate Finance of the SEC. The report stated, "market pressures are driving more
public companies to use improper earnings management tricks" and discussed multiple
rule changes concerning audit committee independence and reviews of interim financial
statements proposed by the Earnings Management Task Force2 •
After many high profile accounting-fraud cases (e.g., Waste Management,

2

This Task Force is a 12-member team created in May 2000 to supplement the SEC's fraud enforcement
efforts and increase the pace of investigations. The team is comprised of a team of accountants and lawyers
who focus exclusively on financial reporting and accounting investigations.

3

Sunbeam, Raytheon, Lucent, Enron, Worldcom, Cendant, Adelphia, Tyco, etc.), Arthur
Levitt's speech seems more like a prophecy. These fraudulent events have been followed
by increased governmental intervention and regulation. On July 9, 2002, the President of
the United States issued an Executive Order for the establishment of the Corporate Fraud
Task Force3 • This ordered the Attorney General to immediately establish, within the
Department of Justice, a Task Force providing direction for the investigation and
prosecution in cases of "financial crimes." Also, on July 25, 2002, Congress responded
by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (with a vote of 423-3 in the House and 99-0 in the
Senate4), which toughened corporate fraud and securities laws in the wake of the
accounting scandals that had shaken confidence in Unites States' financial markets.
This study is motivated by the desire to determine whether market discipline can
be a more efficient monitor of the financial markets than government intervention and
regulation. The specific issue is whether rational investors can detect or predict an
occurrence of accounting fraud using publicly available financial information. If so, it
appears unlikely that regulatory action could improve upon the disciplinary force of
informed securities markets; if not, then we are that much closer to a conclusion that
current accounting standards are inadequate to the task. The results of this study will
provide guidance to analysts, investors, regulators, researchers, and public policy makers
about the efficacy of available tools to detect/predict accounting-fraud. As an example,
let us consider the Enron scandal where accounting-fraud began in "at least early 1997"5
and continued until its financial implosion in 2001, ultimately costing investors over $60
3

Website for the President of the United States,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020709-2.html
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billion. 6•7 Imagine if market participants had better insight into the prediction/detection of
the fraud that was occurring. The question becomes could this scandal, or others, have
been detected earlier, or with greater reliability, could some of this misallocation of
capital been prevented?

4

CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/07/25/corporate.refonn/
AAER 1617
6
CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2001/BUSINESS/12/02/enron.filing/index.html
7
Additionally, Enron issued $1.48 billion in stock during 1998 and 1999

5
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III. Earnings Management Overview and Earnings Management Models
III.A. Definitions of Earnings Management

Academicians, practitioners, and regulators have defined earnings management
many ways:
1. Merchant ( 1987): "Earnings management can be defined as any action on the
part of management which affects reported income and which provides no
true economic advantage to the organization and may, in fact, in the long
term, be detrimental."
2. Schipper (1989): "Earnings management is a purposeful intervention in the
external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private
gain."
3. Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999): "We label earnings management the
strategic exercise of managerial discretion in influencing the earnings figure
reported to external audiences."
4. Healy and Wahlen (1999): "Earnings management occurs when managers use
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes
that depend on reported accounting numbers."
Although all of these definitions are relevant, the lack of concordance and
substantiality provides a poor test structure for research. Dechow and Skinner (2000)
supported this by stating in the "professional literature clear definitions of earnings
management are difficult to discern from pronouncements and/or statements and
speeches by regulators, although an extreme form of earnings management -financial
fraud - is well defined8" (emphasis added). This "well defined" interpretation provides a

8

Financial fraud is defined as "the intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or
accounting data, which is misleading and, when considered with all the information made available, would
cause the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or decision." (National Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners, 1993, 12)

6

format conducive to test the ability of methodologies and models to detect/predict
extreme earnings management.

111.B. Motivations for Earnings Management

As Schipper ( 1989) states, earnings are managed "with the intent of obtaining
some private gain." In this context, any activity in which the owner/manager exercises
influence over reported earnings to increase the compensation/wealth of the
owner/manager are motivations to manage earnings. This includes the four most
commonly cited circumstances leading to a motivation for earnings manipulation: 1)
issue securities, 2) maintain positive earnings or an upward earnings trend, 3) increase
size of earnings-based bonuses, and 4) increase the benefits of insider trading ( Dechow,
Sloan, and Sweeney 1996). Other common reasons to manipulate earnings are to avoid
reporting a pre-tax loss ( Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson 1999), reducing political
costs of the firm (e.g., during a government investigation) (Makar and Alam 1998),
increase the political benefit of the firm (e.g., during import relief investigations) (Jones
199 1), protect large insider holdings ( Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996), or prevent a
downward spiral ( Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson 1999). All of these motivations are
hypothesized to provide an incentive to managers/owners to increase or protect their
wealth by manipulating financial results.

111.C. The Role of Accruals

"[T]he principal goal of accrual accounting is to help investors assess the entity's
economic performance during a period through the use of basic accounting principles
7

such as revenue recognition and matching. "9 Although, the discretion that exists with
accrual accounting provides a means for managers to reveal private information, it also
enables managers to "mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company." 10
Earnings management literature often focuses on the total accruals of a firm;
composed of a non-discretionary portion over which management has little control, and a
discretionary portion over which management has greater ability to adjust.
Total Accruals = Non-Discretionary Accruals+ Discretionary Accruals

Management has the ability to cause short-term changes in earnings11 by adjusting total
accruals since:
Cash from Operations+ Total Accruals = Earnings
By varying the level of discretionary accruals, management has the ability to change the
level of total accruals and thereby affect reported earnings. Sections III.D., III.E., and
III.F. will describe the principal competing models for measuring earnings management.

III.D. Aggregate Accrual Earnings Management Models

Aggregate accrual earnings management literature attempts to develop models
that calculate the discretionary portion of a firm's total accruals. The methodology for
these models is to establish a benchmark of non-discretionary accruals for firms in a

9

Dechow and Skinner (2000)
Healy and Wahlen (1999)
11 Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) state that accruals for their sample ofIPOs reverse in 3 to 4 years.
10

8

specific industry 12 • The portion of accruals estimated to be discretionary for a firm is the
difference between the firm's total accruals and the industry's benchmark of non
discretionary accruals. Aggregate accrual models vary somewhat in their use of different
explanatory variables and adjustments in a given fraudulent firm-year event period,
which are explained in the following section.
Additionally, there are two sources of data to calculate total accruals: the balance
sheet and the statement of cash flows. There are advantages and disadvantages to each
source of data. When testing for earnings management using balance sheet data, accrual
estimates are potentially contaminated by measurement error due to possible non
articulation between changes in working capital accounts and the accrual component of
revenues and expenses on the income statement 1 3• A fault with the cash flow from
operations accrual estimation is the nonavailability of data prior to S F AS No.95 14, and
the limited availability of the data in Compustat 1 5 after S F A S No. 9 5. The primary
tradeoff between the balance sheet and statement of cash flows approach is measurement
error versus data availability.

12

For example, this might be done by using a cross-sectional regression on a given year, across firms with
the same two-digit SIC, of total accruals on changes in certain explanatory variables, such as change in
sales, value of property, plant, and equipment, etc.
13 Collins and Hribar (2000) and Hribar and Collins (2002)
14
Companies were required to make the change for fiscal years ending after July 15, 1988, but earlier
adoption was encouraged.
15
Also, this limitation may create a selection bias in the data.

9

111.D.1. Aggregate Accrual Models with Total Accruals Calculated from Balance
Sheet
a. Jones Model

This model and the majority of subsequent literature calculate total accruals from
year-over-year changes in the balance sheet. Total accruals is defined as:
TAit = (LiCAit - LiCLit- LiCashu- LiSTDit - DEPit) I Ait-1
where:
TAit
LiCAit

= total accruals divided by lagged total assets in year t for firm i;
= change in current assets from year t-1 to year t for firm i (Compustat

#4);
= change in current liabilities in from year t-1 to year t for firm i
(Compustat #5);
=
LiCASHit change in cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to year t for firm i
(Compustat # 1);
LiSTDit = change in debt included in current liabilities from year t-1 to year t for
firm i (Compustat #34);
=
depreciation and amortization expense in year t for firm i (Compustat
DEP
#14);
= lagged total assets for firm i (Compustat #6);
Ait-t
LiCLit

Jones (199 1) relaxes the assumption made by DeAngelo (1986) that nondiscretionary accruals were constant. She proposes a model to account for changes in
non-discretionary accruals based on changes in the economic circumstances of the firm.
She assumes a linear relationship between total accruals of the firm and change in
revenues and gross property, plant and equipment (PPE). Change in revenue is used to
control for the economic growth of the firm and gross PPE is included to control for the
portion of total accruals related to non-discretionary depreciation expenses 16•

16

Jones (199 1) does not discuss the possibility of discretion concerning choice of depreciation schedules,
i.e., straight-line versus accelerated.
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Calculation of the firm-specific parameters a. 1 , a.2, and a.3 are estimated by a
cross-sectional regression for a given year, across firms with the same two-digit SI C, on
the following model:

Then industry-specific non-discretionary accrual proxy is generated with the
following formula:
I\

I\

I\

N D APu = a1 ( 1 / Au-1) + a2 (�REVu I Au-1) + a3 (PP E it I Au-1)

(2 )

The discretionary accruals proxy is estimated using the following formula:
D AP;, = T Au - N D AP;,

(3 )

where:
I\

I\

I\

a1 , a 2, a3
.AR EV;,
PP Eu
N D AP;,
D APu

= industry-specific parameters ;
= change in revenues from year t-1 to year t for firm i ( Compustat #12) ;
= property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i ( Compustat #7) ;

= predicted non-discretionary accruals divided by lagged total assets in
year t for firm i;
= predicted discretionary accruals divided by lagged total assets in year t
for firm i;

b. Modified Jones Model

This version of the Jones model, by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney ( 1995), is
designed to eliminate the hypothesized tendency of the Jones Model to measure
discretionary accruals with error when managerial discretion is exercised over revenues.
It is based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage earnings by exercising discretion
over the recognition of revenue on credit sales, than to manage earnings by exercising
discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales.

11

Calculation of the industry-specific parameters a1, a2, and a3 are estimated by
equation ( 1). Then firm-specific non-discretionary accrual proxy is generated with the
following formula:
A

A

A

NDAPit = a1 (1 / Ait-1)+ a2 ((�REVit - �Cit) I Ait-1)+ a3 (PPEit I Ait-1) (4)
Then the discretionary accruals proxy is estimated using the equation (3).
where:
�Cit = change in receivables in year t minus year t-1 for firm i (Compustat
#15 1)
c. The Performance-Matched Discretionary Accrual Model

Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2002) state, "[t]he use of performance-matched
accruals appears essential to mitigate the concern of misspecification, and therefore
spurious rejection (or failure to reject) of the null hypothesis" concerning the presence of
earnings management. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), Krasznik (1999), and
McNichols (2000) show that discretionary accrual estimates are correlated with earnings
performance. Firms with higher (lower) earnings exhibit significantly positive (negative)
discretionary accruals. This makes it more likely that one will detect earnings
management that increases earnings for the most profitable firms and earnings
management that reduces earnings for the least profitable firms. This model, by Kothari,
Leone, and Wasley (2002), attempts to control for the misspecification exhibited by other
models when applied to firms with extreme financial performance (e.g., Dechow, Sloan,
and Sweeney 1995 and Guay, Kothari, and Watts 1996).

12

First, a firm suspected of managing its earnings is matched with a firm that is
believed not to be managing its earnings by two-digit SIC and ROA. Next, using the
Modified Jones model, the discretionary accruals of both firms are estimated. The
discretionary accrual of the firm suspected of managing earnings is adjusted by the value
of the discretionary accrual of the matched firm.
Calculation of the industry-specific parameters a 1 , a2, and a 3, and the firm
specific non-discretionary accrual proxy are estimated using equation (1) and equation
(4), respectively.
The adjusted discretionary accrual proxy is calculated by the following formulas:
DAPu, adjusted = DAPu, unadjusted

-

DAPu, matched firm

(5 )

111.D.2. Aggregate Accrual Models with Total Accruals Calculated from Statement
of Cash Flows
a. The Modified Jones Model using the Statement of Cash Flows

Usage of the statement of cash flows to calculate total accruals is supported by
Collins and Hribar (2002) and eliminates many of the predictable biases which exist due
to the existence of non-articulation events. Total accruals is defined as:
TAu = - (MR.u + .MNVu + LiAPu + L\TAXu + L\OTHu + DEPu) I Au-1

where:
TAu
MRu
AfNV;,
LiAP;,

(6)

= total accruals divided by lagged total assets in year t for firm i;
= decrease (increase) in accounts receivable in year t for firm i (Compustat
#302);
= decrease (increase) in inventory in year t for firm i (Compustat #303);
= decrease (increase) in accounts payable in year t firm i (Compustat
#304);
= decrease (increase) in taxes payable in year t firm i (Compustat #305);
13

LiOTHit
DEPit
A;,-1

= net change in other current assets in year t firm i (Compustat #307);
= depreciation expense in year t for firm i (Compustat #125);
= lagged total assets for firm i (Compustat #6);

This model addresses the measurement error generated by non-articulation events
when balance sheet data items are used. They argue calculation of total accruals from the
statement of cash flows corrects for errors caused by non-articulation events; such as
mergers and acquisitions which can inflate the balance sheets, divestitures which can
decrease the balance sheet, or foreign currency effects which can have either effect. By
calculating total accruals from the statement of cash flows, Hribar and Collins (2002)
shows the predictable biases generated by non-articulation events can be eliminated. The
disadvantage with this method is that the data is effectively unavailable for fiscal years
ending prior to July 15, 1988, and after July 15, 1988 the data suffers from limited
availability 17 • Calculation of the industry-specific parameters a. 1 , a.2 , and a.3 , and the firm
specific non-discretionary accrual proxy are estimated using equation (1) and equation
(4), respectively. The discretionary accrual proxy is calculated using equation (3).

111.D.3. Discretionary Change in Receivables Adjustment to the Modified Jones
Model

As McNichols (2000) notes, the current construction of the Modified Jones model
(equation (4)) considers all of the change in receivables to be discretionary. It is
17

For the period 1987 to 1997, there are 74,81 9 firm-years with sufficient data to calculate total accruals
using the balance sheet method and 45,1 39 for the cash flow method (66% more for the balance sheet
method). For the period 1989 to 1 997, there are 62,959 firm-years with sufficient data to calculate total
accruals using the balance sheet method and 40,914 for the cash flow method (54% more for the balance
sheet method). Preliminary analysis shows no significant difference between log(market capitalization) and
book-to-market ratios between samples.

14

reasonable to expect this method to be inappropriate since a portion of the change in
receivables can be expected to be non-discretionary . Therefore, I propose an adjustment
to this model to consider only the change in receivables that exceeds the expected change
to be earmarked as discretionary . Where expected change is defined as the revenue
growth rate, in other words this limits nondiscretionary receivables growth to the growth
in revenue . The discretionary change in receivables adjustment to the Modified Jones
model is calculated with following equations:
DiscretionaryAR E C,
A

(�R E C, - (Revenue Growth Rate *R E C,_1))

=
A

( 7)
A

N D AP;F a1 ( 1 / Ait-1)+ a2 ((AR EVit- DiscretionaryAR E Cit)/ Ait-I) + a3 (PP E;/ Ait-1) (8)
Where:
Revenue Growth Rate = (Revenue, - Revenue,-1) / Revenue,_1 ( Compustat #12) ;
R E C,_1 = Trade Receivables in year t-1 ( Compustat #15 1) ;
The example below demonstrates the difference in the portion o freceivables
which are earmarked as discretionary by each method.
Example with company CMT:
CMT's sales were $ 1 B and $ 1 . l B, for the previous and current year, respectively . Trade
Receivables were $ 300M and $ 350M, for the previous and current year, respectively .
With the Modified Jones model, the entire $SOM change in receivables for the firm is
considered discretionary . When only considering the portion of change in receivables that
exceeds revenue growth, $20M 1 8 is classified as discretionary .

18

Sales Growth was 1 0% (($ 1 . IB - $1B)/ $1B), therefore Discretionary Change in Receivables is $20M,
($50M - (10%*$300M)).

15

111.E. Frequency Distribution Earnings Management Models

Frequency distribution models have also been used in attempts to detect earnings
management. The means of detection is quite different from aggregate and specific
accrual methods in that it does not calculate a value of discretionary accruals; instead,
this approach hypothesizes that firms that narrowly exceed a threshold or target earnings
level are engaging in earnings management. Test of this hypothesis analyzes the
distribution of earnings around certain thresholds. For example, when the threshold is
zero earnings, the model tests whether the frequency of earnings realizations in the region
above (below) zero earnings is greater (less) than would be expected in the absence of
earnings management. In other words, is there an abnormality in the distribution of
earnings around zero? If so, then this provides support of earnings management to
surpass that threshold.

111.E.1 Frequency Distribution Models Thresholds

The frequency distribution method has been proposed as evidence of earnings
management by Burgstahler and Dichev (1 997), and Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser
(1 999). These studies analyze a universe of firms around the following thresholds 19 : (1)
zero earnings; (2) past earnings and; (3) analysts' consensus earnings forecast. The
authors postulate that clustering of earnings at, or slightly above, these thresholds support
the existence of earnings management.

19

These thresholds were analyzed by Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser ( 1 999).
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However, this testing method does not distinguish between firm decisions other
than accrual management, which may affect the frequency of earnings around a given
threshold. For instance, since the market response to beating a threshold by one cent per
share is quite different to missing it by one cent per share, a firm may ex ante
conservatively behave or structure contracts to increase the likelihood of being at or
above the zero earnings threshold. To control for contemporaneous macroeconomic and
industry influences upon decisions likely to affect the firm's distribution of earnings, a
matched sample should be used. A test structure that compares the frequency of earnings
realizations around a given threshold for the accounting- fraud sample relative to the
control sample can be used to identify managed earnings ex post.
Research supports the hypothesis that frequency distribution analysis could be a
means to identify extreme earnings managers . The study by Beasley, Carcello, and
Hermanson ( 1999), which analyzed A A ERs for firms from 1987 to 1997, states the most
commonly cited reason why company representatives committed accounting- fraud was to
avoid a pre-tax loss. This provides support for the hypothesized ability of frequency
distribution analysis around the zero earnings threshold to detect extreme earnings
management.
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney ( 1996) supports the hypothesis that frequency
distribution analysis around the past earnings threshold could be a means to identify
extreme earnings managers. Thirty-nine of the firms in their sample had the motivation
for earnings manipulation reported in the enforcement releases filed by the S E C. The
second most common motivation cited (28.2%), after supporting security price in
anticipation of issuance (56 .4%), was to maintain an "upwardly trending EP S." The
17

existence of such earnings trends, and its effect on the distribution of earnings, should
facilitate the ability of frequency distribution analysis around the past earnings threshold
to detect extreme earnings management.
Research does not clearly demonstrate that a common motivation to commit
extreme earnings management is to meet or beat analysts' estimates. The positive stock
price response to meeting/beating analysts' estimates versus the negative price response
to missing has been well documented (Kasznik and McNichols 1999, Skinner and Sloan
2001, and Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002). Since these price responses greatly affect
security issuance and insider trading activity, two commonly cited motivations for
committing accounting-fraud, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that frequency
distribution analysis around the analyst estimate threshold could be used to distinguish
accounting-fraud firms from the matched sample.

111.F. Composite Model

Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Beneish (1997, 1999), and Lee, Ingram,
and Howard (1 999) develop composite models using variables representing the financial
condition, management structure, and other variables in addition to earnings management
estimates, to classify firms that had enforcement actions filed against them by the SEC.
The importance of this methodology is that it allows for consideration of financial
activities and managerial incentives to commit accounting-fraud in conjunction with a
measure of accruals to predict accounting-fraud. My model builds upon these models and
uses selected variables from Beneish (1997), to represent the accounting-fraud and
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matched sample firms in three key areas : 1) accounting choices and behavior that inflates
earnings, 2) financial condition of the firm, and 3) potential opportunistic behavior.
Beneish ( 1997), in addition to developing a composite model to detect extreme
earnings managers, also identifies various financial characteristics which had ability to
predict extreme earnings management firms. The variables represent the firm's age,
assets, liquidity, leverage, profitability, cash flows, total accruals, and growth. These
predictive variables are the foundation upon which my composite model was constructed.

111.F.1. Focus of Composite Model Variables

Usage of variables that inflate earnings is based on the assumption that firms that
wish to increase reported earnings will first exhaust legal avenues prior to committing
accounting- fraud.It is hypothesized that income-increasing accounting methods and
accrual adjustments would be used more often by the accounting- fraud firms relative to a
matched sample in the year prior to committing accounting- fraud. Also, variables
representing the financial condition of the firm are important since avoidance of financial
distress, maintenance of an earnings trend, and/or market premium may be motivations to
commit accounting- fraud. Prior research hypothesizes that firms with financial distress,
longer earnings trend, and/or market premium (lower book-to-market ratio) in the prior
year are more likely to commit accounting- fraud relative to a matched sample. Finally,
variables representing stock issuance and merger/acquisition activity are important since
they represent a potentially opportunistic means to take advantage of an inflated stock
price.It is hypothesized that accounting- fraud firms are more likely to attempt to raise
capital or purchase other firms in the year prior to an accounting- fraud firm-year relative
19

to a matched sample. Therefore, by focusing on variables in these three areas, the
composite model will be better adapted to distinguish accounting- fraud firms from a
matched sample.

20

IV. Earnings Management and Accounting-Fraud Literature Review

Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney ( 1 995) evaluates the ability of alternative aggregate
accrual models ability to detect earnings management. Using a regression-based model,
they test various aggregate accrual models (the Healy, DeAngelo, Industry, Jones, and
Modified Jones model) and find the Modified Jones model performs best in detecting
earnings management. However, when analyzing firms with extreme financial
performance (high growth), all models reject the null hypothesis of no earnings
management at rates exceeding the specified test levels. This result highlights the
importance of controlling for financial performance when investigating earnings
management stimuli which are correlated with financial performance. Kothari, Leone,
and Wasley (2002) propose a performance-based matching procedure to control this
problem.
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney ( 1 996) investigate firms subject to accounting and
auditing enforcement actions (AAERs) for alleged violations of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). Using a logit model, they find the two most important
motivations for earnings manipulation are the desire to attract external financing at low
cost, and to continue an upward trending EPS. Additionally, they find that a stock
issuance and the relative size of that issuance to market capitalization, are statistically
significant variables to distinguish firms subject to AAERs. They analyze median total
and discretionary accruals (generated by the modified Jones model) for 66 firms subject
to AAERs to control firms matched by industry, total assets, and time period, and find
that accruals gradually increased as the year of the alleged earnings manipulation
approached. This increase implies potential predictive power to distinguish extreme
21

earnings managers. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) also shows that a larger
percentage of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC use income-increasing
accounting procedures (the combined choice of straight-line depreciation, FIFO inventory
valuation method, and flow-through method for investment tax credits) relative to a
matched sample and that their usage increases in the years prior to the firm committing
accounting-fraud.
Beneish ( 1997) develops a composite model to detect earnings management
among firms experiencing extreme financial performance and compares the model's
performance to various discretionary accrual models. The model is tested on 64 firms that
were either charged by the SEC or publicly admitted to violating GAAP during the period
of 1983- 1992. His control sample consists of the top decile of all firms with positive
discretionary accruals (hereafter named aggressive accruers) as estimated by the
Modified Jones model. For the holdout sample, the probit model's mean (median)
estimated probability for GAAP violators was 0. 123 (.058) versus 0.026 (.009) for
aggressive accruers. He also compares mean and median values of selected financial
characteristics for event and control firms one year prior to GAAP violation. Although
several of these variables are statistically different between samples, Beneish ( 1997)
never uses them in a prediction type model.
Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson ( 1999) analyze instances of fraudulent
financial reporting as alleged by the SEC in AAERs issued from January 1987 to
December 1997. With fraudulent financial reporting defined as a violation of Rule 10(b)5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and/or Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act
(both of which represent the primary antifraud provisions related to financial statement
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reporting) 294 firms were identified. Focusing on 200 randomly selected firms from that
sample of 294, the authors draw several key insights as to the type of firm that commits
accounting- fraud. Specifically, the authors find many of the companies experienced net
losses or were close to breakeven positions in periods before fraud . Thus, frauds may
have been designed to reverse downward spirals for some companies and preserve
upward trends for others.
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser ( 1999) use the frequency distribution
methodology to check for earnings management around three earnings thresholds. They
find the most important threshold is that the firm report positive profits (earnings above
zero). Once profitability is achieved, the next goal is to sustain recent performance (meet
last years earnings), and finally, the last goal is to meet analysts' forecasts (meet
consensus).
Lee, Ingram, and Howard ( 1999) demonstrates that the excess of earnings over
operating cash flow (i .e., total accruals) was extreme in most fraud cases in the years
prior to public discovery of financial fraud. This finding is based on a sample of 56 fraud
cases from 1978-199 1.Using a logit-based composite prediction model, they find that
total accruals, market performance, firm size, leverage, and stock issuance are
statistically significant explanatory variables to distinguish fraudulent financial reporting
firms from all other firms in Compustat.
McNichols (2000) discusses the trade-offs associated with three research designs
commonly used to detect earnings management : aggregate accruals, specific accruals,
and frequency distribution of reported earnings. She concludes aggregate accruals
models, such as the Modified Jones, that do not consider long-term earnings growth are
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potentially misspecified and result in misleading inferences about earnings management
behavior. This suggests the importance of the performance-matched discretionary accrual
measure as described in Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2002). McNichols suggests future
progress in the earnings management literature would come from specific accrual and
distribution-based tests, rather than from aggregate accrual tests.
Research by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2002) indicates extant discretionary
accrual models were misspecified when applied to firms with extreme financial
performance. Therefore, they examine the specification and power of a test based on a
performance-matched (matching is on ROA and industry) discretionary accrual measure
on stratified-random samples and compare it with traditional discretionary accrual
measures (Jones, Modified Jones). Their results suggested inferences about earnings
management using a performance-matched discretionary accrual measure are more
reliable than a traditional measure of discretionary accruals.
Hribar and Collins (2002) find that previous studies that used balance sheet data
items to test for earnings management are potentially contaminated by measurement error
in accrual estimates. This error is based on the assumed articulation between changes in
working capital accounts and the accrual component of revenues and expenses on the
income statement. Using regression analysis, they find biases are induced by non
operating charges caused by three non-articulation events. Mergers and acquisitions
induce a positive bias to estimated accruals; divestitures induce a negative bias to
estimated accruals; and foreign currency translations induce a positive or negative bias in
estimated accruals, depending on whether the dollar strengthened or weakened relative to
the local currency of the countries in which a company operates. To correct these biases,
24

they calculated accruals using data items from the operating section of the statement of
cash flows, since those data items are not affected by non-operating changes. They
conclude that errors in balance sheet estimation of discretionary and non-discretionary
accruals can confound regression results when those estimates are used as explanatory
variables.
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V. Data

The ideal situation to test models is to have two datasets that are perfectly
partitioned, one fraud sample and one matched non-accounting-fraud sample, without any
errors in classification of the firms. With the knowledge that perfect data does not exist, I
use AAERs to attempt to minimize classification errors in my accounting-fraud and
control sample. Figure A-1 identifies the potential sources of those errors. Per Figure A2, my research focuses on the fiscal years of the "[ a]ccounting fraud period described in
the AAER" in which a fraudulent financial report was filed. Using the data from a
fraudulent firm-year and/or years prior to that fraudulent firm-year (i.e., year that a
fraudulent 1 0-K was filed), I test the ability of various models to detect or predict
accounting-fraud.
The academic importance of this data set is that it represents a means to test
earnings management models against a definitive partition, a "gold standard." Under the
null hypothesis that firms are not committing accounting-fraud, the statistical importance
of having a "gold standard" is that it virtually eliminates the potential of having Type II
errors when testing earnings management models20 • Therefore, the key to accurately
testing these models is the validity of the assumption that the SEC has correctly identified
firms that committed accounting-fraud.
Pincus, Holder, and Mock (1 988) state that the SEC goes to great lengths to
establish that earnings are manipulated knowingly and intentionally before taking an

20

See Figure I concerning the potential sources of Type II errors
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enforcement action. The S E C ( 1992) indicates that, out of the large number of cases
brought to its attention, it only pursues cases involving the most significant and blatant
incidences of earnings management. Also, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney ( 1995) report
the mean (median) earnings restatement of 4.6% (2.3%) of assets for their sample of
firm-years with earnings overstatements as alleged by the S E C. Finally, Dechow, Sloan,
and Sweeney ( 1996) state that they believed the S E C identified extreme earnings
management firms correctly because they verify the firm-years investigated by the S E C
display managed earnings using constructs developed in the academic literature ( for
example, those firms employ more income increasing accounting procedures, have higher
total accruals, and have higher discretionary accruals 2 1 ). Based on this evidence, it is
justifiable to suppose firms cited by the S E C in A A ERs for fraudulent financial reporting,
have indeed committed accounting- fraud. Therefore, under the null hypothesis that firms
are not committing accounting- fraud, the potential for Type II errors is negligible.
There are three categories of papers that use models to estimate discretionary
accruals. One analyzes in circumstances where, a priori, there is a belief earnings are
being managed (e.g., IPOs, S EOs, Management buyouts, Antitrust investigations, Import
relief investigations, etc.) . The second group contains only five papers 22 comparing
earnings management models against A A ERs, the most recent of which is from 1999.
The remainder of research focuses on the universe of firm-years or randomly generated
firm-years in which abnormal accruals are artificially induced. The problem with the
universe of firm-years method is it does not quantify the ability of those models to detect
21

Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) uses only the Modified Jones model calculated using total accruals
from the balance sheet.
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an actual event. The problem with the induced abnormal accrual method is that its
performance is based on the assumption that it is an adequate depiction of true accrual
behavior. This however is questionable, as it assumes the accruals are generated in one
period and fully reverse in the next period. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) note this
concern and state they recognize the validity of their results are contingent upon how
representative their assumptions are of actual cases of earnings management.

V.A. Accounting-fraud Sample

The availability of the data set for my study is due to the generosity of Mark S.
Beasley23, Joseph V. Carcello24, and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO)25 • These data contain information about firms that had
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) filed against them by the SEC.
These fraudulent financial reporting occurrences involved violations of Rule 1O(b)-5 of
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and/or Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, which
represent the primary antifraud provisions related to financial statement reporting.
My initial data set (see Panel A of Table 1), a combination of the three sources
aforementioned, includes 270 firms and 535 firm-years. The two requirements for my
initial data set are: 1) the AAER must state that the firm filed at least one fraudulent 10-K
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Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995, 1996), Beneish (1997, 1999) and Lee, Ingram, and Howard (1999)
Mark S. Beasley allowed me access to the 75 firms, covering the period of 1978 to 1991, used in his
"Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement
Fraud."
24
Joseph V. Carcello allowed me access to his database of AAERs, covering the period of 1998 to 2001.
25 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations and John Flaherty allowed me data access to the study on
"Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987- 1997 An Analysis ofU. S. Public Companies."
23
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(annual report/6 ; and 2) I had to be able to identify a Cusip for the firm. After verifying
that the firms had at least some data in Compustat, my sample dropped to 246 firms and
49 7 firm-years. Further, after verifying that firms had adequate data to calculate the
previous year 's RO A and Modified Jones model discretionary accruals using total
accruals from the balance sheet, the sample dropped to 169 firms and 309 firm-years.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the sample sizes and time periods covered by previous
research. A comparison of Panel A and Panel B of Table 1 shows that my sample size is
significantly larger.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the average accounting-fraud firm had mean
(median) Total Assets of $2.488 billion ( $ 108.2 million) with mean (median) Market
Capitalization of $2.471 billion ( $ 1 32.1 million).Not surprisingly, the mean (median)
total assets is larger than the $5 3 3 million ( $ 1 5.7 million) reported in Beasley, Carcello,
and Hermanson ( 1999) due to the additional data requirements of this study. The sample
size drop in Panel A of Table 2 from the 309 firm-years reported in Panel A of Table 1 is
driven by the capital market data requirement to calculate market capitalization and book
to market ratio. When comparing median values relative to all firms meeting certain data
requirements in Compustat, Panel B of Table 2, accounting- fraud firms have lower Total
Assets, a similar Market Capitalization, lower Book-to-Market ratio, lower RO A, lower
Profit Margin, higher Total Debt to Total Assets, higher Sales Growth, and a lower Z
Score. Overall accounting- fraud firms are growing faster, trading a premium (lower
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Many of the AAERs relate to the overstatement of quarterly earnings that are reversed before the fiscal
year end.
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book-to-market ratio), and less profitable, with a higher degree of financial leverage than
non-accounting-fraud firms in Compustat.
The AAER filing dates range from April 1 982 to December 2002 covering
fraudulent financial reporting that occurred between August 1 978 and December 200 1 .
The accounting-fraud period for my sample averages 1 .981 years and 71 .5% of my
sample committed accounting-fraud for 2 years or less. This is consistent with the
Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson (1 999) average of 1 .975 years and the Dechow, Sloan,
and Sweeney (1 996) average of 2.060 years. Panel C of Table 2 shows that 47.6% of the
accounting-fraud firms only filed one fraudulent 1 0-K, with the remainder extending out
to 7 years with one outlier of 1 2 years in length. Panel D of Table 2 reports the calendar
year that the fraudulent 10-Ks were filed. There are a total of 497 fraudulent firm-years
and 1 993 has the most events with 39 firm-years (7.85%) of the sample. Panel E shows
the distribution of firms that filed a fraudulent 10-K by industry. The largest percentage
of firms is in manufacturing with 75 firms, equivalent to 30.5% of the sample. This is
consistent with research by Beneish (1 997) whose largest percentage was also
manufacturing, at 28. 1 2%.

V.B. Control Sample

A matched firm sample is constructed using the control firm methodology of
Barber and Lyon (1 996). Potential control firms will first have the same Compustat data
item requirements as those of firms in the accounting-fraud sample. Next, to construct the
sample of control firms with similar operating performance, I match on year and two-
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digit SIC. Among these firms, potential control firms whose ROA27 is within +/- 1 0% or
within +/- 0.0 1 of the ROA of the sample firm are earmarked. Finally, among these firms,
I choose that closest match that is not subject to an enforcement release.
Since not all firms that commit accounting-fraud are caught, there exists a
potential source for error in my control sample28 • Without perfect insight, there is no way
to eliminate all firms from the control sample that may have or currently are committing
accounting-fraud, but have not been caught. If as before, we consider the null hypothesis
that firms are not committing accounting-fraud, this problem could introduce Type I
errors. However, if I am able to show a statistically significant difference exists in spite
of this limitation, then I have shown these models have some usefulness to detect/predict
accounting-fraud and therefore, have potential to improve market efficiency.
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Calculated as operating income in year minus 1 (Compustat #13) divided by the average of year minus 1
and year minus 2 book value of total assets (Compustat # 6). Note: Year O is the first year the AAER states
that the fraudulent reporting occurred.
28
See Figure 1
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VI. Formal Statement of Hypotheses

A minimal criterion for the usefulness of earnings management models is their
ability to detect/predict firms committing "an extreme form of earnings management financial fraud."29 If these models cannot detect/predict the most egregious cases of
earnings management, then how can they be expected to detect/predict less extreme
cases? The advantage of my AAER sample is that it contains firms that were extreme
earnings managers, and the fact the SEC filed an enforcement action against them
provides an objective means to classify those events. The control sample provides the
benchmark against which the accounting-fraud sample is compared. Testing the various
earnings management models for their ability to detect/predict the most extreme form of
earnings management and then comparing the results to the control firms, provides a
measure of the relative abilities of those models.
The hypotheses I test concerning the ability of earnings management
methodologies and models to detect and predict accounting-fraud are listed below.
Hl : Aggregate accrual models can detect firms committing accounting
fraud. The purpose is to identify which, if any, aggregate accrual model can distinguish

extreme earnings managers from a control sample. The various aggregate accrual models
tested are the Jones, Modified Jones, Re-Modified Jones, Beneish, and the naive Total
Accruals model. These test results will then be used to determine the relative ability of
such models to detect extreme earnings management.
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Dechow and Skinner (2000)
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H2 : Frequency distribution models can detect firms committing accounting
fraud. The issue is which, if any, threshold analyzed by the frequency distribution model

can distinguish extreme earnings managers from a control sample. The thresholds
analyzed include the zero earnings, past earnings, and analysts' estimate threshold. These
test results will then be used to determine the relative ability of each threshold tested to
detect extreme earnings management.
H3 : Composite model structure can predict public discovery of firms
committing accounting-fraud. Multiple variables are used in the composite model

structure in order to determine their relative ability of such variables to predict extreme
earnings managers.
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VII. Data Analysis Methodology and Empirical Results
VII.A. Analysis of Aggregate Accrual Models
First, I construct a dataset of accounting-fraud firm-years and matched firms that

had adequate data to calculate all aggregate accrual models using total accruals calculated
by both the balance sheet and the statement of cash flow approaches. Using this dataset,
which consists of 1 3 5 event and matched control firm-years 30, I calculate discretionary
accrual estimates from various aggregate accrual models (Jones, Modified Jones, Re
Modified Jones, and Beneish) and naive estimates of earnings management (Total
Accruals model) using both the balance sheet and statement of cash flows. Next, I
calculate the difference (event minus control) between the event and the matched firm
measures of earnings management (discretionary accrual estimate and total accruals) in
accordance with performance-based matching methodology from Kothari, Leone, and
Wasley (2002). The average differences and the associated t-statistics are contained in
Table 33 1 • The t-statistics are significant for some mean differences but not for others, but
neither ANOVA, nor the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test are able to state that one
model statistically outperforms the other models.
From Table 3, two important conclusions are drawn. First, the difference and its
associated t-statistic shows that any aggregate accrual model performs better when using
total accruals calculated from the statement of cash flows, relative to using total accruals
calculated from the balance sheet. This is expected due to the inherent biases caused by

The sample drops from the 309 firm-years to 135 firm-years due to the simultaneous balance sheet and
statement of cash flows data restriction, and losses from control firm matching.
31
Test results were robust on 106 accounting-fraud firms and 106 control firms that were also matched on
market capitalization.
30
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calculating total accruals from the balance sheet due to non-articulation events as
discussed in Hribar and Collins (2002) (merger/acquisition, discontinued operations, and
currency translations). The second conclusion is that the naive model, Total Accruals,
always outperforms the more complicated models that attempt to partition accruals into
discretionary and non-discretionary components. This provides strong support for Guay,
Kothari, and Watts ( 1 996) who conclude that aggregate accrual models "estimate
discretionary estimates with considerable imprecision and/or misspecification" and that
some models "randomly split" accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary
components.
The first result is important because to date, no published research has tested
earnings management measures calculated from the statement of cash flows. This
research shows the potential biases that exist do affect aggregate accrual models' ability
to detect extreme earnings managers. Therefore, prior research should be reevaluated to
check the validity of the results. The second result is important because it questions the
future use of complex aggregate accrual models and advocates the use of the simplest
measure of earnings management, total accruals. Additionally, to date no empirical
aggregate accrual study utilizes simple total accruals as a measure of earnings
management.
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VII.B. Analysis of Frequency Distribution Models

To compare the distribution of earnings3 2 for accounting-fraud firm-years versus
the matched sample, I construct frequency plots of earnings per share around three
thresholds. Tables 4 Panels A and B, Table 5 Panels A and B, Table 6 Panels A and B,
report the distribution of earnings per share around thresholds in certain ranges. Figures
A-4A, A-4B, A-5A, A-5B, A-6A, and A-6B are frequency plots of the distribution of
earnings per share around thresholds in the -0.05 to +0.05 range. Overall, the results are
contrary to hypothesized, showing a larger amount of clustering around the thresholds for
control firm-years than for the accounting-fraud firm-years. Research by Feroz, Park, and
Pastena ( 1991) helps explain this confounding result. They state "GAAP violators also
experience poor performance subsequently, and this likely leads to detection, as the SEC
targets firms with bad news to minimize the likelihood of falsely accusing a firm." This
target bias created by the SEC's selection method33 reduces the ability of frequency
distribution analysis to detect extreme earnings managers. Therefore, to mitigate this
confounding effect, I also analyze earnings distributions for all but the last fraud firm
year (which should be noted also eliminates all one-year events). This corrective action is
based on the hypothesis that poor performance during the last year of the fraud causes the
firm to become the target of an SEC investigation.

Both Earnings per Share (Fully Diluted)-Excluding Extraordinary Items (Compustat #57) and Earnings
per Share (Fully Diluted)-Including Extraordinary Items (Compustat #1 69) were analyzed to verify
robustness.
33
The SEC's targeting bias to investigate firms after experiencing poor performance increases the potential
of type I errors. Thereby decreasing the ability of frequency distribution analysis to detect extreme earnings
managers.
32
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VII.B.1. Zero Earnings Threshold
Clustering of accounting-fraud firms at or above the zero earnings threshold is
supported by Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson (1 999), who state the most commonly
cited reason for financial fraud was to avoid a pre-tax loss. Using all accounting-fraud
firm-years with earnings data (Compustat data item # 57 -Earnings per share excluding
extraordinary items) and a matched sample with the same data requirement, I construct
tables and frequency plots showing the distribution of earnings around zero. Table 4A
and Figure A-4A show that results are contrary to the hypothesis, a larger amount of
matched firms cluster around the threshold relative to the event firms. Additionally, the
means for the distributions are contrary to hypothesized. The mean earnings per share
(EPS) of the event firms at 0.0241 is significantly lower than the mean EPS of the control
firms at 0.7 176. Both ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis34 test reject the hypothesis that these
two samples come from identical populations at the 1% level of significance.
Nevertheless, it may be noted though, that both samples exhibit similar distribution
shapes around the threshold.
However, the SEC's targeting bias is potentially confounding this result. To
control for this, I eliminate any accounting-fraud firm-year that is the last year of the
accounting-fraud. When the last year of the fraud is removed, the event firm mean EPS
raises to 0.2672 and the control firm mean EPS drops to 0.6706 and neither ANOVA, nor
Kruskal-Wallis test are able to reject that these two samples come from identical
populations. There is little change in earnings distribution in proximity to the zero
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-parametric test used when the assumption of normality or equality of
variance is not met. This test, like many other non-parametric tests, uses the ranks of the data rather than
34
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earnings threshold, as indicated by Figure A-4B. Additionally, Panel A of Table 4 shows
that a larger number of event firms miss the zero earnings threshold by a larger margin
relative to the control firms . Panel B of Table 4 indicates that this difference between the
event and control firms is mitigated when the last fraud firm-years are eliminated. These
results, compared to the analysis of all fraud firm-years, support research that the S E C is
more likely to investigate firms that miss the zero earnings threshold .

VII.B.2. Past Earnings Threshold

Clustering of earnings manipulators at or above the past earnings threshold is
supported by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney ( 1996), who found that for their sample
28.2% of the earnings manipulations are motivated by a desire to portray an upward
earnings trend. Using all accounting-fraud firm-years with earnings data ( Compustat data
item # 57 -Earnings per share excluding extraordinary items) for the year of, and the year
prior to the accounting- fraud firm-year and a matched sample with the same data
requirement, I construct tables and frequency plots showing the distribution of earnings
around past earnings threshold . Table 5 A and Figure A-5 A show results that are contrary
to the hypothesis, with more clustering around the threshold for matched firms. The mean
past earnings adjusted EPS of the event firms at -0.2855 is significantly lower than the
mean past earnings adjusted EPS of the control firms at 0.1428. Both ANOV A and
Kruskal-Wallis test are able to reject that these two samples come from identical
populations at the 1 % level of significance. However, it may be noted that both samples

their raw values to calculate the statistic. Since this test does not make a distributional assumption, it is not
as powerful as the ANOVA.
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exhibit similar distribution shapes around the threshold, with the matched sample
showing the higher frequency of operating earnings at or slightly above the threshold.
However, once again, the S E C's targeting bias is potentially confounding this
result. To control for this, I eliminate any accounting- fraud firm-year that is the last year
of the accounting- fraud. When the last year of the fraud is removed, the event firm mean
past earnings adjusted EPS increases to -0.0766 and the control firm mean past earnings
adjusted EPS drops to 0.1 176 and neither ANOV A, nor Kruskal-Wallis test are able to
reject that these two samples come from identical populations. There was little change
relative to all firm-years in earnings distribution in proximity to the past earnings
threshold, as indicated by Figure A-S B. Additionally, Panel A of Table 5 shows that a
larger number of event firms miss the past earnings threshold and by a larger margin
relative to the control firms. Panel B of Table 5 indicates that this difference between the
event and control firms is mitigated when the last fraud firm-years are eliminated. These
results, when compared to the analysis of all fraud firm-years, supports the hypothesis
that the S E C has a targeting bias to investigate firms that miss the past earnings threshold.

VII.B.3. Analysts' Estimate Threshold

Although there is no research that has investigated meeting/beating analysts'
estimates as a motivation to commit accounting-fraud, there are obvious incentives for
firms to do so. Firms that are motivated to commit accounting- fraud for securities
issuance or to maintain an upward earnings trend (two commonly cited motivations)
would certainly benefit from meeting/beating analysts' estimates. Additionally, Skinner
and Sloan (200 1) shows that growth stocks (defined as firms having a low book-to39

market ratio) suffer abnormally large negative price responses to missing analysts'
estimates relative to non-growth stocks. Therefore, since firms in the accounting-fraud
sample have above average revenue growth rate and are trading at a premium (low book
to-market ratio), there appears to be incentives for those firms to manage earnings to
meet/beat analysts' estimates.
Using all accounting-fraud firm-years with earnings data (Compustat data item #
57 -Earnings per share excluding extraordinary items) and IBES median analysts'
earnings estimate data for the accounting-fraud firm-year and a matched sample with the
same data requirement, I construct tables and frequency plots showing the distribution of
earnings around consensus analysts' estimate threshold35 • Table 6A and Figure A-6A
show that contrary to the hypothesis, the matched sample shows a larger amount of
clustering at and above the threshold than accounting-fraud firms. The mean analysts'
forecast error of the event firms at -0.6971 is significantly lower than the mean analysts'
forecast error of the control firms at 0.3246. Both ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis are able
to reject the hypothesis that these two samples come from identical populations. Also, in
this case, unlike the zero and past earnings threshold analysis, the samples do not exhibit
similar distribution shapes around the threshold. There exists a significantly larger
number of accounting-fraud firms barely missing the threshold by one or two cents
relative to the matched sample, 10 versus 3 respectively. Also, there exists a significantly
larger number of control firms meeting or beating the threshold by one or two cents, 12
versus 6 respectively.

35

The IBES analysts' estimate data restriction caused the sample size to drop markedly.
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Again, the SEC's targeting bias is potentially confounding this result. To control
for this, I eliminate any accounting-fraud firm-year that is the last year of the accounting
fraud. A comparison of Figure A-6A and A-6B shows that even though the last year of
the fraud was removed from the sample the distribution of earnings in proximity of the
threshold is similar. Additionally, Tables 6A and 6B indicate that accounting-fraud firms
miss earnings estimates more often than matched firms in either case. In support of this,
unlike previous thresholds, even though sample size decreased to 47 firm-years, ANOVA
and Kruskal-Wallis are able to reject that these two samples come from identical
populations with p-values at 1 1 % and 1 2%, respectively.
Unlike the results with zero and past earnings thresholds, when using the earnings
estimate threshhold, the hypothesis that the event and control firms come from identical
populations can be rejected, even after controlling for the SEC ' s targeting bias. This
implies that the targeting bias is less pronounced for missing analysts' estimates than it is
for missing zero and past earnings thresholds. This hypothesis is supported by the
pecking order of thresholds espoused by DeGeorge, P atel, and Zeckhauser (1 999), where
the order of importance is first the zero, then past earnings, and lastly analysts' estimate
threshold. This also agrees with Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson ( 1 999) who state that
pressures of financial strain or distress may have provided incentives for fraudulent
activities. In other words, the firms' main concern was viability, not meeting analysts '
estimates.
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VII.B.4. Overview of Threshold Analysis
Missing the zero and past earnings threshold appears to be used by the SEC as a
means to identify potential firms to be investigated. Once the targeting bias that exists is
controlled by removing the last year of fraud from the analysis, the accounting-fraud and
matched sample earnings distributions are not statistically different, although there are a
larger number of matched sample firms than accounting-fraud firms at or slightly above
the thresholds. This provides little support for frequency distribution analysis around the
zero and past earnings threshold to detect accounting-fraud firms.
A question for future research is what motivates the analysts' excessive optimism
concerning earnings estimates for accounting-fraud firms. Analyzing 33 event and 33
control firms that had adequate Compustat and IBES data for two years prior to the first
year of accounting-fraud provides some insight. Preliminary results indicate that two
years prior to the first year of fraud, the accounting-fraud firms on average beat analysts'
estimates by a greater margin than the matched firms. One year prior to the first year of
accounting-fraud, the accounting-fraud firms and matched firms are approximately equal
in meeting analysts' estimates. One year later, i.e., in the first year of fraud, accounting
fraud firms miss estimates more often and by a larger margin than the matched sample.
This implies that the analysts' optimism may be fueled by prior earnings performance
and that the fraud was perpetrated to prevent missing estimates by an even wider margin.
This suggests that analysts ' do not adjust for accruals when making estimates consistent
with Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2000). These preliminary results relate directly to
section VII.C. l which discusses the selection of Composite model variables that inflate
earnings.

42

VII.C. Composite Models

Two key issues exist concerning predictive composite models: 1) whether prior
period variables have the ability to predict accounting- fraud and 2) if measures of
earnings management, such as total accruals, are important relative to other variables. By
adding to the predictive variables suggested from Beneish ( 1997), a logit model is
constructed to predict accounting- fraud by using only data from periods prior to the
accounting- fraud firm-year in question.Variables for composite model are selected from
three areas based on managers' utility-maximizing behavior. Therefore, variables
covering income-increasing choices, financial condition and opportunistic behavior of the
firm are chosen.

VII.C.1. Variables that Inflate Earnings

Based on managerial utility-maximizing behavior, it is reasonable that managers'
would first pursue legal income-increasing options prior to committing fraud. Therefore,
the presence of accounting choices that inflate earnings is more likely in years prior to
fraudulent activity. Total accruals the year prior to accounting- fraud is the variable used,
since within the confines of GAAP, a firm has some leeway to inflate earnings for a short
period of time. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney ( 1996) and Beneish ( 1997) support this by
showing that total accruals increase in the years approaching the fraud year as identified
by the AA ER. Lee, Ingram, and Howard ( 1999) state that total accruals peak sometime in
the three years prior to the beginning of fraudulent accounting activity. It is expected that
total accruals in years prior to accounting- fraud would be greater for the event firms than
for the matched sample. Therefore the odds ratio, which is greater than one if the variable
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increases the probability of fraud, or below one if the variable decreases the probability
of fraud, is expected to be greater than one for total accruals.
The Accounting Change Binary is 1 if the firm institutes an accounting change the
year prior to an accounting-fraud firm-year, 0 otherwise. Due to the potential of such
changes to inflate earnings, it is expected that the odds ratio would be greater than one.
The Flow Through Investment Tax Credit Binary is 1 if the firm uses the credit
the year prior to an accounting-fraud firm-year, 0 otherwise. The flow through method
reduces taxes by the entire amount of the credits allowed in the year the asset that is
placed into service, thereby temporarily inflating earnings. The expected use of this tax
credit should be higher for the event versus the control firms in periods prior to
committing fraud, therefore it is hypothesized that the odds ratio will be greater than one.
The Straight-line Depreciation Binary is 1 if the firm uses straight-line
depreciation the year prior to the accounting-fraud firm-year, 0 otherwise. Since the use
of straight-line depreciation relative to accelerated depreciation, ceteris paribus, inflates
earnings, it is hypothesized that the odds ratio will be greater than one.
Various binary variables are used to represent the inventory valuation method. If a
particular inventory valuation method is used the year prior to the accounting-fraud firm
year then the binary is equal to 1 , 0 otherwise. Since FIFO and Specific Identification
methods have the greatest potential to inflate earnings relative to other methods, it is
hypothesized the odds ratio for those variables will be greater than one. The odds ratios
for other inventory valuation methods are expected to be less than or equal to one.
Finally, managers may use discontinued operations (defined as discontinued operations
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gain or loss deflated by total assets) as a means to write-off losses to portray higher
operating earnings, therefore it is hypothesized that the odds ratio will be less than one.

VII.C.2. Variables that Represent Financial Condition
Since accounting-fraud is often committed by firms under financial distress,
variables that represent the financial condition of the firm the year prior to the
accounting-fraud firm-year are chosen. Since low working capital over total assets, low
profit margin, low cash flow over total assets, low cash sales growth, and a low Z-Score
could represent financial distress, it is expected that the odds ratio would be less than one
for those variables. Also, since high leverage can represent financial distress it is
expected that the odds ratio would be greater than one for the total debt to total assets
variable.
According to the opinion of the former Chief Accountant of the SEC's
enforcement program (Diacont 1 995), in his experience, many of the companies which
became the subject of an enforcement action, did so in the context of an initial public
offering or as a result of financial statement manipulations shortly after their initial public
offering. Beneish (1 997) goes on to state that, "[y]ounger firms may thus be subject to
closer scrutiny if the SEC perceives them as higher risks." This perception is consistent
with evidence from Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1 987), which states that younger
firms are more likely to experience financial distress. Therefore, since younger firms may
be subject to closer scrutiny and/or financial distress, it is expected that my proxy
variable for firm age, time covered by Compustat, would have an odds ratio less than one.
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Since firms with a lower book-to-market ratio are largely valued by future growth
opportunities, a reversal in expectations about future firm performance would have a
marked effect on the value of the firm. Firms trading at a premium have a greater
incentive to commit fraud to prevent a reversal. Therefore, it is expected that the odds
ratio for the book-to-market ratio would be less than one.
Additionally, according to Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1 997), firms that maintain
earnings trends trade at a premium and experience an asymmetric price drop when that
trend is broken. Since it is hypothesized that the motivation to commit fraud would be
positively related to the length of the earnings trend experienced, it is expected that for
the length of a zero and past earnings trend variables that the odds ratio would be greater
than one.

VII.C.3. Variables that Represent Potential Opportunistic Behavior

If firms have inflated earnings and/or are trading at a premium, managers have an
incentive to act opportunistically by issuing equity or to purchase other firms. Fraudulent
firms may undergo mergers/acquisitions to take advantage of the firm's inflated stock
price to purchase other firms. Or they may use complicated merger/acquisition
accounting to build reserves which are improperly reversed later. Levitt (1 998) states
"[s]ome acquirers, particularly those using stock as an acquisition currency, have used
this environment as an opportunity to engage in another form of 'creative' accounting."
Levitt (1998) calls it "merger magic" and continues on to say ''troubling is the creation of
large liabilities for future operating expenses to protect future earnings -- all under the
mask of an acquisition." Therefore, the odds ratio for merger/acquisition binary is
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expected to be greater than one. Also, since a firm in such a position would want to buy
firms that would have the greatest contribution to its income and sales, it is hypothesized
that merger/acquisition contribution to income and sales would have an odds ratio greater
than one.
Finally, firms that have inflated their earnings and/or are trading at a premium
(lower market-to-book ratio relative to their peers) because of fraud are expected to issue
shares to take advantage of such a situation. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the odds
ratios for a stock issuance binary and the ratio of stock issuance proceeds to market
capitalization would be greater than one.

VII.D. Composite Model Data
VII.D.1. Composite Model Data Description

The descriptive statistics for the 162 accounting-fraud firm-years and the 162
firm-years in the control sample are shown in Table 8 (see Table 7 for variable
definitions), which presents the means, medians, and the significance of their difference.
The sample size drops from 309 firm-years due to the increased data requirements for the
event and control firms. As shown in Table 8, accounting-fraud firms are younger firms
with higher total accruals, more total assets, more leverage, higher sales growth, and a
lower book-to-market ratio. They use income increasing accounting choices such as
straight-line depreciation, FI FO or Specific identification inventory valuation, or :flow
through investment tax credit more often than the control firms.
One particularly interesting point is that 35.2% of event firms undergo a
merger/acquisition the year prior to the accounting- fraud firm-year analyzed versus
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14.2% for the control firms, statistically different with a p-value of < 1 %. Those
mergers/acquisitions increase sales by an average of 5.0% for the event sample versus
2.4% for the control sample. Another interesting point is that 1 3.0% of the event sample
issues equity the year prior to the accounting- fraud firm-year analyzed versus 4.9% for
the control sample. Accounting- fraud firm issuances are also larger, increasing market
capitalization by 2.2% for the event sample, versus 0.9% for the control sample.

VII.D.2. Composite Model Logistic Regression

Table 9 reports the results of the logistic regression's ability to distinguish
accounting- fraud firms from the control firms . The model is defined as follows :

M = P 'X,
Where Mis a binary that is equal to 1 for the accounting- fraud firms and Mis equal to 0
for the control firms, P is a matrix of coefficients, and Xis a matrix of explanatory
variables. The extended version of the logistic regression is defined as follows :
M = P1 *(/'otal Accruals by BIS) + P2 *(Working Capital over Total Assets) +
p3 *(Total Assets)

+ p4*(Total Debt

to Total Assets)+ Ps *(Profit Margin) + P6 *(Cash Flow

over Total Assets by BIS)+ p7*(Sales Growth)+ P8 *(Cash Sales Growth)+ p9 *(Book to
Market) + P1o*(Altman 's Z-Score) + P11 *(/'ime covered by Compustat) + P12*(Zero
Earnings String) + Pn *(Past Earnings String) + Pu *(Discontinued Operations over
Total Assets)+ P1s *(MergerlAcquisition Contribution to Income) +
P1 6 *(MergerlAcquisition Contribution to Sales)+ Pn*(Accounting Change Binary) +
P1a *(Flow Through Investment Tax Credit Binary)+ P1 9 *(Straightline Depreciation
Binary)+ P20 *(Replacement Cost Inventory Binary) + P21 *(Standard Cost Inventory
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Binary) + P22*(Retail Method Inventory Binary) + P23*(Average Cost Inventory Binary)

+ P24*(Specific Identification Inventory Binary)+ P2s*(FIFO Inventory Binary) +
P26 *(Stock Issuance Binary)+ P27*(Stock Issuance Proceeds over Market Cap.)
The logistic regression is stacked to test a certain sequence of explanatory
variables. First, to test the predictive ability of the model that exhibits the best ability to
detect accounting-fraud (as reported in Table 3) is estimated (column 1 of Table 9), total
accruals calculated from the balance sheet. 36 The second stacked regression (column 2 of
Table 9) adds the predictive variables, excluding the proxy for firm age (time listed in
Compustat) which is included later, recommended in Beneish (1 997). The following
stacked regressions add various variables in stages representing book-to-market ratio and
Altman's bankruptcy score (columns 3 of Table 9), proxy for age of the firm and earnings
trends (columns 4 of Table 9), discontinued operations and mergers/acquisitions
(columns 5 of Table 9), accounting and inventory valuation methods (columns 6 of Table
9), and stock issuance information (columns 7 of Table 9). Using data only from years
prior to the accounting-fraud firm-year to be predicted, the model that includes all the
explanatory variables properly classifies 64.2% of the event firm-years and 67.3% of the
control firm-years, with an overall percentage of correctly classified at 65.7%. Each
statistically significant variable has its hypothesized odds ratio value, above or below
one37 •

36

Total accruals from the statement of cash flows was not used since that additional data restriction caused
a significant drop in sample size, from 162 to 68 event and control firm-years.
37
Results are consistent when events and controls were also matched by year, 2-digit SIC, ROA, and
market capitalization. This additional market capitalization restriction of +/- $250 million or +/- 10%
caused the sample to drop from 162 to 129 event and control firm-years.
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Total accruals by B/S has the expected odds ratio and is statistically significant at
the 10%, or better, for the majority of the regressions in Table 9. Sales growth and Cash
Sales Growth have the anticipated odds ratios which state that firms with high Sales
Growth, but low Cash Sales Growth are more likely to be accounting-fraud firms. This
implies that firms are supporting sales growth through the use of credit to their
customers. Time Covered by Compustat has its hypothesized less than one odds ratio
implying that younger firms are more likely to commit accounting-fraud, agreeing with
Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich ( 1987), and Diacont ( 1995).
The existence of a merger/acquisition the year prior to the accounting-fraud firm
year to be analyzed is a highly significant variable to properly classify accounting-fraud
and matched sample firms. Additionally, Mergers/Acquisitions Contribution to Sales
odds ratio is greater than one as hypothesized, but is only significant at the 10% level.
This implies that accounting-fraud firms are more likely to undergo mergers/acquisitions
that contribute the greatest to current firm sales.
Straight-line Depreciation Binary has the expected odds ratio of greater than one,
implying that firms exercise legal options to increase earnings in periods prior to
committing accounting-fraud, but is only marginally significant with a p-value of 13.6%
or 11.6% depending on the model analyzed. Consistent with inflating earnings legally
prior to committing accounting-fraud, Specific Identification Binary and FIFO Binary are
statistically significant and have odds ratios greater than one, and significance at the 3%
and 7% level, respectively. Although the stock issuance variables odds ratios are greater
than one, they are not statistically significant in the logistic regression.

50

Neither the zero, nor past earnings strings variable were significant, implying that
maintaining an earnings trend is not a sufficient motivation to commit accounting- fraud.
This may be explained by the fact that Table 8 shows that average earnings trends are
actually shorter for event firms, implying that their premium (lower book-to-market
ratio), if it existed, may have been due to other factors. Also, although the Book-to
Market has the expected odds ratio, it is not statistically significant.

VII.D.3. Composite Model Conclusion

The logistic regression provides evidence of firm characteristics and behaviors
that help distinguish accounting- fraud firms from a matched sample, based upon data
available in the year prior to the filing of a fraudulent annual report, per the A A ER. The
significance of variables representing income-increasing accounting choices, financial
condition of the firm, and potentially opportunistic behavior by management
demonstrates the importance of considering measures of earnings management in
conjunction with managerial incentives to commit accounting- fraud. Overall, the
composite model indicates younger firms, with higher total accruals and sales growth,
using income-increasing accounting choices, with merger/acquisition activity are more
likely to commit accounting-fraud. Concerning the use of Beneish's predictive variables,
my results support research reported in Beneish ( 1997). The statistical significance of
total accruals as a predictor of accounting fraud supports Lee, Ingram, and Howard
( 1999). The lack of statistical significance of the variables representing earnings trends is
contrary to expected based on the motivations for extreme earnings management
discussed in Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson ( 1999) and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney
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(1996). The significance of FIFO inventory valuation methods is consistent with
hypotheses presented in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) and Beneish (1997), but
contrary to previous research, my results provide statistical support to those hypotheses.
The marginal significance of Straightline Depreciation is consistent with an hypothesis
presented in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), but my research is the first to provide
statistical evidence of its significance. However, the lack of significance of the stock
issuance variables in the logit model was contrary to Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney
(1996), however the test of means between the event and control firms supports prior
research.
My results add to the body of knowledge by showing that maintaining an earnings
trend is not a sufficient motivation to commit accounting-fraud. Additionally, it shows
that the use of the Specific Identification inventory valuation method the year prior to an
accounting fraud firm-year is statistically significant variable in predicting extreme
earnings management. It also shows that merger/acquisition activity the year prior to
committing accounting fraud is highly statistically significant. Implying that accounting
fraud firms act opportunistically to benefit from complicated acquisition accounting
and/ or possibly an inflated stock price.
Results indicate that variables other than total accruals add significant power to
the model's ability to distinguish accounting-fraud firm-years from matched firm-years.
Table 9 shows that, as variables representing managerial incentives to commit fraud are
added, the statistical significance of total accruals decreases (from a p-value of 0. 1% to
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1 1.4%), while the model's percent properly classified increases from 5 5.6% to 6 5.7%38 •
Including these additional variables increases the model 's performance and provides
better insight into the condition and behavior of the firm prior to a fraudulent firm-year.
By recognizing certain firm characteristics and behaviors ; investors, regulators,
and accountants can enhance their ability to predict fraudulent accounting. This can help
investors improve the allocation of their capital and help accountants recognize
fraudulent activities that would misallocate such capital. Additionally, such knowledge
provides a means for the S E C to improve their prediction of accounting- fraud. This may
lessen the S E C's targeting bias to investigate firms only after the fraud is so severe that
financial implosion is probable. If the S E C can discover violators earlier, it reduces the
benefits that current and future firms may receive by acting fraudulently, thereby
decreasing occurrences of such fraudulent activity.

38

This result is robust even when total accruals from the statement of cash flows is used.
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VIII. Conclusion and Additions to Literature

Over the last five years, accounting-fraud scandals have had a tremendous effect
on U.S. financial markets and the U.S. economy. Government has responded with the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by Congress, the establishment of the Corporate
Fraud Task Force by the President of the United States, and the redoubled focus of the
SEC on fraudulent activities. This confirms the intent of lawmakers and regulators to
improve accounting practices and provide tougher penalties for those who commit
financial crimes.
Simultaneously, academia has developed methodologies and models in an attempt
to improve the transparency of the financial markets and reduce the amount of
misallocated capital. The majority of the academic literature focused on using accruals to
assess the extent to which firms managed their earnings, commonly analyzing instances
in which earnings management was likely (such as Initial Public Offerings, Secondary
Equity Offerings, Import Relief lnvestigations, management buyouts, etc.), but not
definite. Unfortunately, little direct evidence has been provided to distinguish which
methods worked best when there existed a virtual certainty about which firms were
extreme earnings managers.
Many of the papers addressing the use of accruals to manage earnings have not
dealt with the most egregious abuses of investors - abuses deemed serious enough to
bring about charges of fraud by the SEC. This research attempts to further the evaluation
of earnings management models as tools for detecting and predicting financial fraud.
Using the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) to establish relative certainty, accounting-fraud firms are
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definitively partitioned from non-accounting-fraud firms. This "gold standard" for
distinguishing between fraud and non-fraud firms provides a robust situation to
contribute to the literature by testing the ability of aggregate accrual, frequency
distribution, and composite models to distinguish accounting- fraud firms from a matched
sample.
Broadly speaking my strategy focuses on two separate goals: the detection and
prediction of extreme earnings management. The research goal to detect accounting-fraud
is supported by two subcategories: the aggregate accrual and frequency distribution
analysis models. Their purpose is to detect accounting-fraud using the current and past
period data available. The research goal to predict accounting-fraud includes the
composite model structure whose purpose is predict the public discovery of accounting
fraud using data only available the year prior to the fraudulent event.
Concerning detection with aggregate accrual models, my research has contributed
by being the first to utilize total accruals from the statement of cash flows and
performance-matched aggregate accrual models using cash flow data items using a "gold
standard," A A ER dataset. Results indicate all discretionary accrual models with total
accruals calculated using the statement of cash flows resulted in statistically significant
differences between fraud and non- fraud firms (at the 5% level of significance).
However, only the naYve model of Total Accruals resulted in statistically significant
differences when calculated using total accruals from the balance sheet. These results
provide support for the theoretical work by Hribar and Collins (2002) concerning non
articulation event induced biases and noise in total accruals calculated from the balance
sheet. Additionally, my results indicated that total accruals, my non-partitioned naYve
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measure of earnings management, always outperformed discretionary accrual models.
Although tests did not indicate that model results were statistically different, the fact that
a naive measure could marginally outperform the partitioned measures of accruals
provides unique empirical support for Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996) conclusion that
aggregate accrual models "estimate discretionary estimates with considerable imprecision
and/or misspecification" and that some models "randomly split" accruals into
discretionary and non-discretionary components. Furthermore, it is important to consider
that total accruals is also the easiest to calculate. Based on the apparent imprecision with
which discretionary accrual models partition accruals, and the cost of calculation of those
models, it is difficult to justify the future usage of such models. Therefore, investors,
regulators, and accountants can enhance their ability to detect accounting-fraud firms and
reduce their computational cost to detect fraudulent accounting by using the simplest
model, total accruals, calculated using the statement of cash flows.
Utilizing a previously unused matched firm perspective for frequency distribution
analysis, my research compares accounting-fraud and matched sample earnings
distributions around three earnings thresholds. Initial results of frequency distribution
analysis are unable to support a hypothesis that accounting-fraud firms were
meeting/beating thresholds more often than matched firms. However, when analyzing the
zero and past earnings thresholds for all but the last year of a multi-year fraud, evidence
of a targeting bias was discovered, providing empirical support for the hypothesized SEC
targeting bias by Feroz, Park, and Pastena ( 1991). This is shown since prior to controlling
for the SEC's targeting bias, earnings distributions were statistically negatively skewed
for the accounting-fraud firms as compared to the matched sample, but after removing the
56

last year of all frauds from analysis to control for the targeting bias the two distributions
were statistically indistinguishable.
In concordance with Guay, Kothari, and Watts ( 1996) and Beneish ( 1997), who
conjectured that models that also consider managers' incentives have a better chance to
identify extreme earnings managers, my composite model uses variables to represent
firms' financial condition, use of income-increasing accounting choices, and potentially
opportunistic behavior the year prior to accounting- fraud to distinguish fraud and non
fraud firms. My composite model analysis, using a larger sample than used in prior
research, supports research by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney ( 1996), Beneish ( 1997) and
Lee, Ingram, and Howard ( 1999) that firms made income-increasing accounting choices
prior to an enforcement action being filed. This implies fraud was committed because the
offending firms' had already exhausted legal options to better represent their firms'
performance.
This research also contributes to the literature by showing that potentially
opportunistic merger/acquisition activity in periods prior to public discovery of
accounting- fraud statistically distinguishes extreme earnings managers. Such behavior is
hypothesized to be opportunistic, based on Levitt ( 1998) discussion concerning creation
of large liabilities for future operating expenses to protect future earnings, aptly named
"merger magic." Merger/acquisition activity may also be opportunistic through the use of
inflated stock prices to acquire other firms due to the use of income-increasing
accounting choices during the purchase period. The statistically larger sales contribution
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of the merged/acquired firms for accounting-fraud firms relative to the matched firms39
supports this hypothesis implying that future accounting-fraud firms, realizing that their
stock is overvalued, used it to buy larger firms relative to the matched sample. However,
future research of purchase method and characteristics of the firm purchased are needed
to definitively state that mergers/acquisitions are opportunistic.
In summary, the analysis employing the composite model for distinguishing
between fraud and non-fraud firms offers potentially important insights for the prediction
of fraudulent accounting. Future accounting-fraud firms are younger, higher growth,
more leveraged firms that trade at a premium (lower book-to-market ratio) relative to
their peers. They are more likely to choose income-increasing accounting choices (such
as straight-line depreciation, FIFO or Specific Identification inventory valuation methods,
and Flow Through Investment Tax Credits) and more likely to participate in potentially
opportunistic merger/acquisition activity in the year prior to filing a fraudulent annual
report relative to a matched sample.
Using a significantly larger database than that used in prior research, my research
contributes to the body of knowledge by testing previously analyzed methodologies and
models, testing previously untested methodologies and models, and providing unique
extensions and results related to the performance of those tests. My research shows that:
1) the simplest aggregate accrual model using total accruals from the statement of cash
flows works best to detect accounting-fraud, 2) the frequency distribution analysis has no

39

When only the first year of fraud is analyzed both contribution to sales and contribution to income
variables were statistically larger. This indicates that accounting-fraud firms merged/acquired larger firms
that contributed the most to net income. Results were robust using both total accruals from the balance
sheet and the statement of cash flows.
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ability to detect extreme earnings management, and 3) the composite model provides
unique insight into different variables that can aid in the prediction of accounting-fraud .
Future research should focus on merger/acquisition behavior in periods prior to
accounting- fraud firm-years. A key unanswered question from this research is whether
merger/acquisition activity by the accounting- fraud firm is opportunistic.Is the purpose
to take advantage of overvalued stock prices due to income-increasing accounting
choices used by the firm or an attempt to fuel the growth of the firm and reverse a
downward spiral of the firm's performance? Or is it simply that a merger/acquisition
provided another opportunity for firms take advantage of accounting procedures to
obfuscate th eir firm's true performance. Future research should also focus on extending
the composite model research to include management structure and holdings. Combining
variables representing governance of the firm, as used by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney
( 1996), will likely add to the ability of the model to distinguish managerial incentives to
commit accounting-fraud.
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Al l Firms

Potential Source
of Type 11 Errors

Potential Source
of Type I Errors

Figure A-1. Potential Sources of Type I and Type II Errors.
The shaded portions indicate the potential sources of Type I and Type II errors.
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Public announcement
of alleged accounting
fraud

SEC announcement of
investigation

Time

Accounting-fraud period
described in the AAER

Date AAER
issued by the
SEC

Figure A-2. Chronological Order of AAER Events.
Chronological order of events for a typical firm subject to an Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release (AAER).
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Table 1. Compustat Data Comparison with Prior Research.
Panels A and B
Panel A: Dissertation's Sample S ize
fraud
time
Study
' period
firms

Starti_ng sampl.e with a Cusip

1 978-2001

· Sample after data restriction*

1 978-2001

!
L �ample with data in Comp�stat

1 978-2001

270

246
169

· fraud finn
years

matching criteria

535

Industry and ROA

309

Industry and ROA

-

I

497 _ ! Industry and ROA

· * Restricted on the most co"l)lex discretionary accrual calculation used in previous literature

Panel B: Prior Studies' Sample Size
fraud
time
Study
firms
peri: od

32
92
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1 996) 1 982-1 992- (66 used)
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1 995) 1 982-1 992

Beneish (1 997)

Summers and Sweeney (1 998)

I Lee,_ Ingram, and Howard (1 999)

1 983-1 991

1 980-1 987
1 978 1 991
-

64
51

56

rraud firmy.ears
56

N/A
N/A
NIA
NIA

matching criteria

·All other firms m
industry

S IC and Market Cap.
All firms in highes
decile of discretionary
accruals

SIC and Market Cap. 1

All other firms
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Table 2. Accounting-Fraud and Compustat Summary Statistics.
Panels A and B
Accounting- fraud and Compustat firm-year summary statistics for 1978-200 1. Finn-years
included have adequate data to calculate total accruals by the balance sheet, with sales
and assets greater than $ 10 million. The sample size drop in Panel A from the 309 firm
years reported in Panel A of Table 1 is driven by the capital market data requirement to
calculate market capitalization and book to market ratio. Additionally , the top 0.05% and
bottom 0.05% values were removed from Panel B to minimize outliers in Compustat.
jPanelA: Accounting-fraud firm-year s unmary s tabs bcs (n = 239)
Variable8
mean j med ian i std dev
mmmum max imum l
n
65503.b 1
2·39
248BAi
foa�21··-11a8:'§ ,,,__
fetal Assets ($mliions )
__ ,_,2470�1(' ·· 732_f(
93490.41
'3·9
9751.3·
- ·1 .
Market Cap. ($mlllons)
,,,,,_
' "'''"o:scr •'> " "'"M''"-0�29
' ' 239
"" <:Lb
2.
0.61 1 ' "
Bookto Market
' 1s:3�o ; -· - •»- 239
1 9. 1 %
-93.oo/;l
1 0:6%1 ·- f3.0%
ROA
Profit Marg in
-4.9%'
2.7%
33.5% , -2 1 4.8°/4 1
29.6%'1
239
•.• . . .. . d . 5 \ ·.· . 0 . 52 1 ·. .•. · . . 0 24 · . ·.· . • . . .Oii
. . 239
2
1. 20
O
.
Totl al 09bf to Totai Assets
·
,,
a e ro h
238
S s G w t ---- · ,_. MM>M-•• 53' 2'0/i ': '•"""' 2a·a0Jc ''"'" 1 52 7% ' . ,.,. 58 20/t" ' "1 751 6 '
--- 59 •6% l
1 36:9¾' "" �71 . 1 % ! 'f39 a:1% ) .., . 221
. Cas h Sales Grow th
r
-•
"
'
-•·
'·--'"
23a
4 .34 \
4 . 63. ----:1c 12t·-..·-····--:ls:4 '?"[
2. 91 . •-•w- •~ 7:43
1A1tman•s·2-score
._,_o
·
,,
___
,
_ ,,,,! :'o2r,,
·i
,
�T,,--,, -·-239
!Years covered"by"Corfi>us'faC , ___ _ J
i
;
r

"'"31:2% "'"

iPanel B: Corrpustat firm-year s unmary s tatistics (n = 99884)
Variable8
me�-� .,. J . . ��(��---- I _, s_!� ���- - �-� i�E1:l ___ L '.:!'9X i�',!l,, i ..
, ..
.
1 356.1 1.
1 33.3
5877.3
1 0.0 1 2441 92.5 1
rrotal Ass ets ($mllion s )
1
4:cI;'"
,_
_
"
'
__
··
To3:
,
,
,
3
;r
2
nsT
.
.
,
,
.
,
aboo
:i '. . . ,.. ,,,. , . . .
,
m1T
·
.
.
($
o
p
Ca
i
rket
Ma
;'
Book to l\narket
0.79 !
0.80
0.33
0.03 ;
2.90 1

J

:��ftftlargin

;�:��J:fJ�!�!:."!::�

sets

Cash.Sa les Grow th

�-d:-t>t: ·s-964?5:�t· ·: :� ��aa�

-- - -�-- -· - -·-

�t��}._. . , .!t:�i- - · !�:��- . . -:.�i;-:: · --·T;:::;fL....

99884
99823

· -· --·
,_;:�!
.
. .·· ·
·
.
. · · ·� -- --·-2s���·\••.• ·•• · -••.•··1 �1���l •··-- ····•·• -1·s},�l· ·· · : ..·-:a :s�§�i••·• ··:f
I . •. ::•.•::��; •
••
· .. 1 s1.' s % ....:·453a :l3'%(·rrns·s:o/<¼ ., . .,. . . ,, .9T549·
24:s%r··--· - To: 4 °7�r-~
l

1�sl§�f

Altman's Z-Score
4.40:
3.24 !
6.03
-1 5.40 !
1 37.61 :
98723
Years"cover-eaby ·<Arrpuslar· 1 ,, ....,, - ·· n:G3l' ,.,. ,.., ·· 101' . . . ,,., .. s:20 · - -~· ---- ""ll ···---·-·-- · - 391· • >• --99·as4
Variable
Total Assets
M arket Cap.

M arket Capitalization = Share P rice1 (#24) x N umber of Commo n Shares Outstanding1 (#25)

Book to M arket

Ratio of bo ok value of total assets to the sum of bo o k value of liabilities and preferred stock
and the market value of co mmon equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the anno uncement
[Book to M arket =Total Assets1 (#6)/(Total Assets1 (#6)-(Shareholders' Equity1 (#2'6) 
P referred Stock Valu9i (#56, unless missing, then # 1) unless missing, then # 'BO)) + M arket
Capitalizatio n1 (#24"'#25))]

R OA
P rofit M argin
Total Debt to Total Assets
Sales Growth

R eturn on Assets = Operating Inco me Before Depreciation1 (# 'B) / Total Assets1 (#6)
Inco me Befo re Extrao rdinary ltem s1 (# 11) / Sales1 (#12)
Current Liabilities1 (#5) + Lo ng-Term Debt1 (# 9) / Total Assets1 (#6)
Sales Growth R at9i = (Sales1 (# 12) - Sales1•1 ) / Sales1•1

Cash Sales Growth

Cash Sales Growth Rate1 = (Cash Sales 1 - Cash Sales 1•1 ) I Cash Sales,.1 where: Cash Sales1
= (Sales1 (# 12) - (Receivables1 (#2)- Receivables1•1))

Altman's Z-Sco re

Altrnan's Z-Sco 1"19t = ((Earnings B efo re Interest and Taxes1 (# fl8) / Total Assets1 (#6)) x 3.3) +
((Sales1 (# 12) / Total Assets1 (#6)) x0.999) +(M arket Capitalizatio "i (#24"'#25) / Total
Liabilities1 (# 111) x 0.6) +(Current Assets1 (#4) - C urrent Liabilities 1 (#5) I Total Assets1 (#6) x
t2) +(Retained Earnings1 (#36) I Total Assets1 (#6) x 14)

Years covered by Com pustat
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• Variable Definition
Total Assets of the firm (#6)

As a proxy for age of the firm, the variable represents number of years that the firm reported
data in Com pustat.

Table 2. Continued.
Panels C, D, and E
Number of fraudulent annual reports per firm, and the number of fraudulent firm-years
per calendar year, and distribution by 2-digit SI C of fraudulent firm-years and all firm
years in Compustat.
i Panel C- l'tlniler of Annual Reports ( 1 0-Ks) w ith reporting violations
• y•_••,•,•.•.•, v•A

..,._._,,_... .., .,..,..,,. .., ,..,..,•.. .,,.,•.. .,,.,,.,

# of 1 0-Ks
# of firms

I

....... ..

1

117

Nuni>er of Annual Re�_?.�� ( 1 0-Ks) per accountin�-fraud firm
.
4
10
31
5
7
8
9
2
6
59

39 \

20

8

1

1

0

0

11

1 2- .w.-Total:
.._..,,.,.,.•,,,.,.w"

'89

'90

0

1

0

246

! Panel D: Calendar years in w hich firms cormitted accounting-fraud
year of violation
# of firm-years

'79
2

year of violation I

'91

# of firm-years

2-digit SC

........,.......-.�--,.

01 -09
1 0-19

20-29
.,..,._......,_...,_,.,.,.,..
.,..,.,...,.,,,,._.,....

30-39
40-49
50-59

60-69
70-79
80-89
90-99

36

Fiscal year-end of accounting fraud violation
'80

3

'92
36

'81

6

'93

39

'82

13

'94
35

'85
'84
'86
1 3 ...,_...,..,.,_...,_...,_.,...1_...........,
3_, :,.,,.,.,.,..._...,_.,,,_.,,,_.,,1.,_._.,,3_, ....,,...,._...,_...,_...,20

'95

33

I Panel E SIC distribution of firm-years
Industry description

Manufacturing

Transportation and utilities

29

--- �···

34

61

Personal and business services

80

Health and other services
F\Jblic admnistration

63
26
9

497

'88
25

'99

'00 !

20

%

__

._.,.,..,.,_

15

68
1 40

'98
25

34 1

1

\/Vholesale and retail

Financial services (excl. 60-63)

'97 )

# of
accountingfraud firmyears

�

Agriculture, Forestry, �IShing
Mning and construction

Corrmodity production

'96

19

'87

'83

,_

0.2%

3.0%

-·

1 3.7%

28.2%
6.8%

1 2.3%
1 2.7%

16. 1 %
5.2%

1 .8%

1 00.0%

,•

"•W.Y

.....,.................,,

13]

'01

7

# of
Col'Tl)US tat

firm-years
1 1 71

1 9797

··-

--- +�
26

37

497

%
-·-·-····-•'-'"______.

0.5%

7.9%
1 4.4%

.
i,....-....,.-.....-,., .-....,_.,.........._...,,....,...,.,..............,.,.,.-,,.

35874
69441

27.9%

29022

1 1 .7%

,..,.....--,-Y.Y.W,.Y,_,y

271 07

21916

32057

My,•,•;,.,,,....,,_.,

9907
2801

249093

1 0.9%

8.8%
1 2.9%
4.0%
1 .1 %

1 00.0%
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Table 3. Comparison of Aggregate Accrual Estimates Mean Differences.
Comparison of aggregate accrual estimates mean differences (event firms' mean minus
control firms' mean)
Jones
BIS

Jones
CF

0.0913

0.0877

-0.0336 -0.0591

TA BIS
event firms'
rman
control
firms' rman

0.1206

TA CF

M:>d.

Plod.

ReMJd.

ReMJd.
Jones
CF

Beneish Beneish
BIS
CF

Jones
BIS

Jones
CF

0.1220

0. 1032

0.1 230

0.0895

0.1 1 92

0. 151 3

0.1 31 1

0.0207

0.0097

0.0235

0.0099

0.01 78

0.0081

0.0816

0.0084

Jones
BIS

rman
difference

0.1 542

0. 1 504

0.0670

0. 1 1 23

0.0797

0. 1 1 32

0.071 7

0.1 1 12

0.0697

0.1228

t statistic

2.65

3.70

1 .07

2.06

1 .28

2. 18

1 .12

2.13

0.75

2.24

p-value

0.0091

0.0003

0.2862

0.041 0

0.2020

0.0308

0.2639

0.0347

0.4550

0.0265

percent
positive

65.2%

68.9%

63.7%

59.3%

62.2%

60.0%

63.0%

60.0%

62.2%

60.0%

3.44

4.30

3. 10

2.07

2.75

2.24

2.93

2.24

2.75

2.24

0.0003

0.0000

0.001 0

0.01 94

0.0029

0.01 26

0.0017

0.01 26

0.0029

0.0126

z statistic
p-value

Note 1: Even though the t-statistics are significant for some mean differences but not for
others, neither ANOVA, nor Kruskal-Wallis tests were able to say that the mean
differences were statistically significant from one another.
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0.18
0.1 6
0.14
0. 1 2
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00

TA BIS

TA CF

Jones
BIS

Jones
CF

1\/od.

1\/od.

Rel\/od.

Rel\/od. Beneish Beneish

Jones
BIS

Jones
CF

Jones
BIS

Jones
CF

B/S

CF

Figure A-3. Graph of Aggregate Accrual Estimates Mean Differences.
Graph of aggregate accrual estimates mean differences (event firms' mean minus control
firms' mean). Y-axis is the aggregate accrual estimates mean difference and the X-axis is
the type of aggregate accrual model used.
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Table 4. Distribution of Earnings Around the Zero Earnings Threshold.
Panels A and B

Panel A contains the distribution operating earnings (Compustat #57) for all event and
control firm-years around the zero earnings threshold. Panel B contains the distribution of
operating earnings (Compustat #57) for all event and control firm-years, excluding the
last firm-specific fraudulent firm-years and control firm-years, around the zero earnings
threshold.
Panel A: All Fraud Firm-Years (See· Note 1 )
-0. 05 to -0.01
< -0.05
At zero
0.01 to 0. 05 1
1 13
8
4
1·6
35.2%
2 . 5%
1 .2%
5.0%
II
Controls:
7
82
11
17
I
25.5%
I
3.4%
2.2%
5.3%
I
,321 ewnt firm�ye.a rs and 32 1 control firm-years
EPS:
Ewnt.s,:

!Panel B: All But Last Fraud Firm-Years
(See-Note 2),
-EPS:
< -0. 05
-0.05 to -0. 01
0.01 to 0.05
At zero
I
Ewnts:
44
7
10
1
4. 1 %
26.0%
5.9%
0.6%
Contr-o ls:
2
43
8
9
I
25.4%
1 .2%
5. 3%
4.7%
1 69 ewnt fim,. -years and 1 69 control firm-years.

> 0.05
180
56. 1 %
204
63.6%

> 0.05
1 07

I

6, 3 . 3%

1 07
63. 3%

Notel : Both ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test are able to reject that these two samples
come from identical populations at the 1% level of significance.
Note 2: Neither the ANOVA, nor Kruskal-Wallis tests are able to reject that these two
samples come from identical populations.
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Figure A-4A. Frequency Plot of Annual Operating Earnings for All Firm-Years.
Frequency plot of annual operating earnings (Compustat #57) for all event and matched
control firm-years that were within+/- 5 cents of the zero earnings threshold.
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Figure A-4B. Frequency Plot of Annual Operating Earnings for All But the Last
Fraud Firm-Years.
Frequency plot of operating earnings (Compustat #57) for all event and control firm
years, excluding the last firm-specific fraudulent firm-years and matched control firm
years, that were within+/- 5 cents of the zero earnings threshold. .
Figure A-4. Frequency Plots of Annual Operating Earnings.

73

Table 5. Distribution of Earnings Around the Past Earnings Threshold.
Panels A and B
Distribution of earnings around the past earnings threshold for event and matched control
firms are presented. Past earnings adjusted EPS is calculated by current annual operating
earnings (Compustat #57) minus the previous year's annual operating earnings. Panel A
reports results for all event and control firm-years. Panel B reports results for all firm
years, excluding the last firm-specific fraudulent firm-year for events and controls.
Panel A: All Fraud Firm-Years (See Note 1 )
0.01 to 0.05
-0.05 to -0.01
At zero
< -0.05
161
16
8
5
2.5%
51 . 1 %
5. 1 %
1 .6%
Controls:
20
1 17
20
8
6.3%
37. 1 %
2.5%
6.3%
31 5 event firm-years and 31 5 control firm-years

> 0.05
1 25
39.7%
1 50
47.6%

Panel B: All But Last Fraud Firm-Years (See Note 2)
EPS:
-0.05 to -0.01
< -0.05
At zero
0.01 to 0.05
Events:
72
5
2
10
3.0%
43.4%
1 .2%
6.0%
Controls:
63
10
7
9
38. 0%
6.0%
4.2%
5.4%
1 66 event firm-years and 1 66 control firm-years

> 0.05
77
46.4%
77
46.4%

EPS:
Events:

Note 1: Both ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test are able to reject that these two samples
come from identical populations at the 1% level of significance.
Note 2: Neither the ANOVA, nor Kruskal-Wallis tests are able to reject that these two
samples come from identical populations.
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Figure A-SA. Frequency Plot of Annual Operating Minus Past Operating Earnings
for All Firm-Years.
Frequency plot of current annual operating earnings (Compustat #57) minus past annual
operating earnings for all event and matched control firm-years that were within +/- 5
cents of the past earnings threshold.
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Figure A-5B. Frequency Plot of Annual Operating Minus Past Operating Earnings
for All Firm-Years.
Frequency plot of current annual operating earnings (Compustat #57) minus past annual
operating earnings for all event and control firm-years, excluding the last firm-specific
fraudulent firm-years and matched control firm-years, that were within +/- 5 cents of the
past earnings threshold.
Figure A-5. Frequency Plots of Annual Operating Earnings Around the Past
Earnings Threshold.

75

Table 6. Distribution of Analysts' Forecast Errors.
Panels A and B

Distribution of analysts' forecast errors for event and matched control firms are
presented. Forecast errors are calculated by I B E S median earnings estimate minus
operating earnings ( Compustat #57). Panel A reports results for all fraud firm-years.
Panel B reports results for all firm-years, excluding the last firm-specific fraudulent firm
year for events and matched controls.
Panel A: All Fraud Firm-Years (See Note 1 )
At zero
0.01 to 0.05
-0. 05 to -0. 01
< -0. 05
7
3
14
62
6. 1 %
2.6%
1 2.2%
53.9%
15
10
5
Controls:
32
1 3.0%
4.3%
8.7%
27.8%
1 1 5 event firms and 1 1 5 control firms
EPS:
Events:

Panel B: All But Last Fraud Firm-Years (See Note 2)
At zero
0.01 to 0.05
-0.05 to -0.01
EPS:
< -0.05
4
1
15
Events:
9
8.5%
2. 1 %
1 9. 1 %
31 .9%
2
5
Controls:
4
14
4.3%
1 0.6%
29.8%
8.5%
47 event firms and 47 control firms

> 0.05

29
25.2%
53
46. 1 %

> 0.05

18

38.3%
22
46. 8%

Note l : Both ANOV A and Kruskal-Wallis test are able to reject that these two samples
come from identical populations at the 1 % level of significance.
Note 2: ANOV A and Kruskal-Wallis test are able to reject that these two samples come
from identical populations with p-values of 1 1 % and 12%, respectively.
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Figure A-6A. Frequency Plot of Analysts' Forecast Error for All Firm-Years.

Frequency plot of analysts' forecast errors for all event and matched control firm-years
that were within +/- 5 cents of the forecast error threshold. Analysts' forecast errors are
calculated by IBES median earnings estimate minus operating earnings (Compustat #57).
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Figure A-6B. Frequency Plot of Analysts' Forecast Error for All But the Last Fraud
Firm-Years.

Frequency plot of analysts' forecast errors for all event and control firm-years, excluding
the last firm-specific fraudulent firm-years and matched control firm-years, that were
within +/- 5 cents of the forecast error threshold. Analysts' forecast errors are calculated
by IBES median earnings estimate minus operating earnings (Compustat #57).
Figure A-6. Frequency Plots of Analysts' Forecast Error Threshold.
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Table 7. Composite Model Variable Definitions.
Summary statistics of event and matched sample firms one year prior to an accounting
fraud firm-year
Variable Definitions

Variable
Total Assets

Total Assets of the firm1. 1 (#6)

Market Cap.

Market Capitalization = Share Price.. 1 (#24) x Number of Common Shares Outstanding1_1 (#25)

Book to Market

ROA
Profit Margin

Ratio of book value of total assets to the sum of book value of liabilities and preferred stock and
the market value of common equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement [Book to
Market1. 1 =Total Assets,. 1 (#6)/(Total Assets,. 1 (#6)-(Shareholders' Equity1.1 , (#21 6) - Preferred
Stock Value1. 1 (#56, unless missing then #1 0, unless missing then (#1 30)) + Market
Capitalization1. 1 (#24*#25))]
Return on Assets = Operating Income Before Depreciation1. 1 (#13) / Total Assets,_1 (#6)
Income Before Extraordinary ltems,.1 (#18) / Sales,_1 (#1 2)

Total Debt to Total Assets (Current Liabilities1• 1 (#5) + Long-Term Debft. 1 (#9)) / Total Assets,.1 (#6)
Sales Growth Rate = (Sales,. 1 (#12) - Sales,.2 ) I Sales1•2
Sales Growth
Cash Sales Growth Rate = (Cash Sales,.1 - Cash Sales,.2 ) / Cash Sales1•2, where: Cash Sales,
Cash Sales Growth
1 = (Sales,. 1 (#12) - (Receivables 1• 1 (#2)- Receivables,.2))
Altman's Z-Score

Altman's Z-Score = ((Earnings Before Interest and Taxes1_1 (#1 78) / Total Assets,. 1 (#6)) x 3.3) +
((Sales1. 1 (#12) / Total Assets,. 1 (#6)) x 0.999) + (Market Capitalizatior1t.1 (#24*#25) / Total
Liabilities,. 1 (#1 81) x 0.6) + (Current Assets,. 1 (#4) - Current Liabilities, (#9)

As a proxy for age of the firm, the variable represents number of years that the firm reported
data in Compustat.
Number of consecutive years that operating earnings (#57) was greater than or equal to zero
Zero Earnings String
as of t-1 .
Number of consecutive years that operating earnings (#57) was greater than or equal to the
Past Earnings String
prior year's operating earnings as of t-1 .
Discontinued Operations Discontinued Operations over Total Assets = Discontinued Operations1• 1 (#66) / Total Assets,. 1
over Total Assets
(#6)
Merger/Acquisition Binary = 1 if the firm underwent a merger/acquisition year t-1 (footnote code
Merger/Acquisition Binary
#1), 0 otherwise
Merger/Acquisition Contribution to Income = Merger/Acquisition Contribution to lncome..1
Merger/Acquisition
(#248) / Net lncome1. 1 (#172)
Contribution to Income
Merger/Acquisition Contribution to Sales = Merger/Acquisition Contribution to Sales1. 1 (#249) /
Merger/Acquisition
Sales1. 1 (#12)
Contribution to Sales
Accounting Change Binary = 1 if the firm underwent an accounting change (footnote code #1 ,
Accounting Change Binary
5, 6, 9, 1 0, 12, 20, 23, and 30) in year t-1 , 0 otherwise
Flow Through Investment Flow Through Investment Tax Credit Binary = 1 if the firm used Flow Through Investment Tax
Credit (footnote code #8) year t-1 , O otherwise
Tax Credit Binary
Straightline Depreciation Straightline Depreciation Binary = 1 if the firm used Straightline Depreciation (footnote code
#1 5) year t-1 , 0 otherwise
Binary
Replacement Cost Inventory Replacement Cost Inventory Binary = 1 if the firm used Replacement Cost Inventory Valuation
Method (#59) year t-1 , 0 otherwise
Binary
Standard Cost Inventory Standard Cost Inventory Binary = 1 if the firm used Standard Cost I nventory Valuation Method
(#59) year t-1 , 0 otherwise
Binary
Retail Method Inventory Retail Method Inventory Binary = 1 if the firm used Retail Method Inventory Valuation (#59) yea,
t-1 , o otherwise
Binary
Average Cost Inventory Average Cost Inventory Binary = 1 if the firm used Average Cost I nventory Valuation Method
(#59) year t-1 , 0 otherwise
Binary
Specific Identification
Specific Identification Inventory Binary = 1 if the firm used Specific Identification Inventory
Valuation Method (#59) year t-1 , 0 otherwise
Inventory Binary
Replacement Cost Inventory Binary = 1 if the firm used Replacement Cost I nventory Valuation
FIFO Inventory Binary
Method (#59) year t-1 , 0 otherwise
Stock Issuance Binary
Stock Issuance Binary = 1 if the firm issued equity the year t-1 , 0 otherwise
Stock Issuance Proceeds Stock Issuance Proceeds over Market Cap.= Equity issued the year prior to an AccountingFraud Firm-Year / Market Capitalization1_ 1 (#24*#25)
over Market Cao.
Years covered by
Compustat
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Table 8. Composite Model Variable Summary Statistics.
Summary statistics of event and matched sample firms one year prior to an accounting
fraud firm-year
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Table 9. Composite Model Logistic Regression Results.

Logistic regression results to distinguish accounting- fraud firms (n = 162) from a
matched sample (n = 162)
predicted
odds ratio
value

Independent variables

Intercept
Total Accruals by BIS
Working Capital over Total
Assets
Total Assets
Total Debt to Total Assets
Profit Margin
Cash Flow over Total Assets
Sales Growth
Cash Sales Growth
Book to Market
Z-Score
Time covered by Compustat
Zero Earnings String
Past Earnings String
Discontinued Operations over
Total Assets
Merger/Acquisition Binary
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odds ratio

N/A

40.2%

39.7%

34.854
0. 1 %

1 78. 1 56
3.2%

1 90.3 1 8
2.7%

90.344
6.7%

93.853
6.6%

72.822
10.1%

62. 1 62
1 1 .4%

<1

1 .000
1 00.0%

0.9 1 3
89.4%

0.753
68.2%

1 .096
89.8%

1 .488
59.2%

1 .401
65.2%

<1

1 . 000
5.1%

1 .000
5.4%

1 .000
1 .4%

1 .000
1 .0%

1 .000
0.4%

1 .000
0.4%

>1

1 .478
58.3%

1 .995
36.2%

2. 1 56
31 .8%

2.399
26.3%

1 .765
48.6%

1 .703
5 1 . 3%

<1

0.924
91 . 1 %

1 .220
77.7%

1 .252
75.8%

1 .238
77.4%

1 .096
91 .0%

1 .075
92.9%

<1

0. 1 23
21 . 1 %

0.086
1 4.3%

0. 1 60
30.6%

0. 1 63
31 . 1 %

0 . 1 88
37.2%

0.204
39.6%

>1

1 1 .225
0. 1 %

1 3.505
0.0%

1 2.621
0. 1 %

8.497
0.4%

6.890
1 .0%

6.171
1 .7%

<1

0.270
2.6%

0.21 0
0.6%

0. 1 85
0.4%

0. 1 87,
0.4%

0.224
1.1%

0.237
1 .5%

<1

0.637
27.7%

0.658
32.6%

0.601
24.5%

0.596
25.0%

0.597
25.6%

<1

1 .023
30.9%

1 .028
25.5%

1 .032
1 8.9%

1 .022
37.4%

1 .021
39.2%

<1

0.9 1 9
0.4%

0.921
0.7%

0.91 8
1 .2%

0.920
1 .4%

>1

0.999
96.7%

0.992
79.6%

0.999
98.4%

0.997
92. 1 %

0.937
53.5%

0.969
76.9%

0.968
76.9%

0.956
69.0%

0.858
96.2%

0.470
81 . 8%

0.483
82.5%

2.377
1 .0%

2.972
0.3%

3.005
0.2%

0.997
95. 1 %

1 .000
99.9%

0.999
99. 1 %

6.6 1 6
8.6%

8.1 1 6
6.5%

8.263
6.3%

>1

p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio

>1

I

p-value
odds ratio

>1

p-value
odds ratio

>1

I

p-value

Merger/Acquisition
Contribution to Income

odds ratio

Merger/Acquisition
Contribution to Sales

odds ratio

>1

p-value
p-value

N/A

88. 1 %

p-value
odds ratio

N/A

N/A
54.5%

p-value
odds ratio

N/A
55.6%

p-value
odds ratio

N/A

N/A
35.5%

p-value
odds ratio

N/A
72.6%

p-value
odds ratio

Dependent variable = 1 for accounting fraud firms, O for
matched firms

>1

I

Table 9. Continued.
Independent variables
Accounting Change Binary

odds ratio
odds ratio

Straightline Depreciation
Binary

odds ratio

Replacement Cost Inventory
Binary

odds ratio

Standard Cost Inventory
Binary

odds ratio

Average Cost Inventory Binary
Specific Identification
Inventory Binary
FIFO Inventory Binary
Stock Issuance Binary
Stock Issuance Proceeds over
Market Cap.
Likelihood Ratio
Percent Correctly Classified

Dependent variable = 1 for accounting fraud firms,
matched firms

>1

0.859
69. 1 %

>1

1.113
71 .8%

1 .088
77. 9%

>1

1 .637
1 3.6%

1 .691
1 1 .6%

0.000
99.0%

0.000
99.0%

<1

0.524
57.7%

0.539
59.4%

<1

1 .536
78. 1 %

1 .645
74.7%

<1

0.685
50.7%

0.685
50.9%

>1

1 3.247
3.0%

1 1 .641
3.8%

>1

1 .773
7 .0%

1 .772
7.1%

I

p-value
p-value
<1

p-value

I

p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio
p-value
odds ratio

o for

0.867
70.4%

p-value

Flow Through Investment Tax
Credit Binary

Retail Method Inventory Binary

.

predicted
odds ratio
value

>1

1 .331
75.4%

>1

3. 1 58
77.4%

p-value
odds ratio
p-value
p-value

1 3.686
0.0%

47.240
0.0%'

50.626
0.0%

64.230
0.0%

75.358
0.0%

93.621
0.0%

94.752
0.0%

55.6%

59.0%

60.2%

65.1 %

66.0%

65.7%

65.7%
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